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BACKGROUND Saudi Arabia’s oil production and proven reserves play an important role 
in global energy security. This thesis examines topics in energy security, with a focus on 
Saudi Arabia and security implications for both the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and regional 
considerations for the Middle East. Chapter 1 examines the role of Saudi Arabia as a 
swing producer of oil and the effect this has on U.S. security. Saudi Arabia uses this role 
as an instrument of state power, allowing it to maintain an influential position in 
international relations. Chapter 2 examines the impacts of the U.S. shale oil revolution 
on Saudi Arabia’s stability. Since Saudi Arabia uses oil export funds for internal and 
external stability, an increased shale oil market share creates a long-term stability 
vulnerability. Chapter 3 examines how changes to U.S. energy independence may affect 
the balance of power in the Middle East in the future.  In the end, economic interests 
are more important to the U.S. than the physical supply of oil. 
AIM This research study identifies Saudi Arabia’s role as a swing producer and assess 
what it means in the context of U.S. energy security. By examining when Saudi Arabia 
abandons this very critical role, the aim is of generating a theory related to the area of 
U.S. energy security. The research also aims to understand Saudi Arabia’s relationship 
with oil and its implications because of U.S. shale oil revolution. The final aim is to 
understand how U.S. energy independence is causing Saudi Arabia and other powers 
with interests in the region to maneuver.    
METHOD A use case methodology is used to guide data collection, analysis, and 
reporting.  Data was collected from scholarly journals, books, and various newspapers 
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and magazines. Chapter 1 uses congruence procedures to investigate dissimilarities 
between when Saudi Arabia acted as a swing producer and when it abandoned the role. 
The data collected and analyzed in Chapter 1 related to the importance of Saudi Arabia’s 
role is employed in Chapter 2 to understand the implications of Saudi Arabia’s collapse 
due to shale oil.  Chapter 3 continues on the shale oil theme, which helps the U.S. 
achieve energy independence, to analyze cases that have indicated shifts in U.S. policy 
decision-making in the region. The analysis methods utilized the balance of power 
theory to understand the regional players in the empirical data. 
FINDINGS Through the congruence procedure use case analytical process, it emerged 
that Saudi Arabia uses its swing production role as an instrument of state power to play 
a critical role in keeping the market balanced, but it abandons that role when its market 
share is threatened by competition. Oil is an essential source of power in maintaining 
internal and regional stability but it and the country are under threat due to the 
unconventional oil revolution.  The benefits of enhanced U.S. energy independence due 
to unconventional oil have given the country flexibility to diverge from traditional 
policies in the region, causing concern amongst Saudi Arabia and to begin searching for 
new alliances, potentially weakening U.S. influence and regional stability.   
CONCLUSIONS Saudi Arabia plays a unique and critical role in the oil market that it seeks 
to preserve for self-interests. This role of swing producer is undertreat because of the 
destabilizing effects shale oil will have on the country.  The U.S. has already began to 
pivot to Iran, causing Saudi Arabia to begin its shift to other global powers. The U.S. 
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hegemony in the Middle East is undertreat due to these geopolitical trends, likely 
placing the region’s balance of power in disequilibrium. 
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In the fall of 2012, I chose to immerse myself in the Johns Hopkins Masters in 
Global Security Studies. My courses covered contemporary subjects that gave me a 
better understanding of world politics, foreign affairs, and international security. For the 
past three years, I closely followed and researched Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical situation, 
relating it to my course work and how it affects U.S. national security. For my thesis, I 
chose to focus on energy because it is what I view as the most important security 
variable in the relationship.  
The topic selection was rewarding due to the turmoil over the past few years. At 
the start of the research in 2013, King Abdullah Al Saud ruled Saudi Arabia, oil was over 
$110 a barrel and the Islamic State was unknown. The outcome of the Arab Spring was 
also unknown and had glimpses of positive change for the region.  Since then Saudi 
Arabia saw a major leadership reshuffle including a new king, Salman Al Saud. The 
country waged a draining and protracted war in Yemen.  The Islamic State declared its 
caliphate and became a global threat.  The U.S. relations with Iran improved significantly 
after reaching agreement on the nuclear framework. Moreover, the Saudi government 
budget saw historic deficits after oil price fell below $33 a barrel.  
Some of the predictions and assumptions I was making in 2012 have come into 
fruition including the price drop of oil and Saudi budget deficit.  I thought excess shale 
oil supply was going to be the direct cause, but it turns out the primary factor is Saudi 
Arabia’s excess supply, aiming to protect the countries market share against U.S. shale 
oil and remerging Iranian production.  This suggests that while not perfect, the selection 
of my research is on the right track and its relevance to global security is timely.  
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Saudi Arabia’s oil production and proven reserves are critical to global energy and U.S. 
national security.  Similarly, the U.S. plays a vital role in Saudi Arabia’s stability by acting as its 
main guarantor of security against internal and external threats.  This alliance is shaped by 
mutual benefit for both parties  This thesis examines topics in energy security, with a focus on 
Saudi Arabia, the security implications for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, and regional security 
considerations for the Middle East as a whole.  
The thesis is structured into three chapters that are thematically tied.  Chapter 1 
researches the benefits and motivations of why Saudi Arabia acts as a swing producer of oil, and 
how that ties back to U.S. national security.  In this research it was discovered that acting as a 
swing producer has tremendous benefit for Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and the global energy 
security framework.  However, there were times when Saudi Arabia stopped acting as a swing 
producer, mainly when prioritizing its own interests over that of the U.S. or the world.   
It was discovered in Chapter 1 that U.S. shale oil was the contemporary threat that 
caused Saudi Arabia to stop acting as a swing producer. Due to this finding, I chose to research 
the impact of U.S. shale oil on Saudi Arabia’s stability for Chapter 2. In this research, I discovered 
that U.S. shale oil was a double-edged sword for Saudi Arabia because it threatens the countries 
oil export market share and it enhances U.S. energy independence, giving it the flexibility to 
pursue policy that is in U.S. interest, but not always in Saudi Arabia’s interest.  
Chapter 3 takes the policy disagreements highlighted in Chapter 2 between the two 
traditional allies to examine the impact of U.S. energy independence on the region’s balance of 
power. I examine the range of alliance options Saudi Arabia has and how pivots to U.S. rivals 
weakens U.S. hegemony in the region.  My hypothesis is that energy independence combined 
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with the Iran nuclear deal will change the U.S. relationship with its Gulf allies, which will cause 
various shifts in geopolitical alliances and the region’s balance of power.  
Chapter 1 aims to define Saudi Arabia’s role as ‘swing producer’ and assess what it 
means in the context of a U.S. energy security framework. This thesis contributes to the field of 
energy security and further understanding of the link between oil dependence and U.S. national 
security by addressing the following research questions: Why does Saudi Arabia act as a swing 
producer in the global oil market and what impacts does it have on U.S. national security? 
This research question is important because it seeks to explain if states with large 
resource endowments can use them as a source of hard and soft power for geopolitical 
leverage.  Saudi Arabia uses its swing production role as an instrument of state power to 
maintain its position in the international geopolitical system and strengthen its balance of 
power and relationship with the U.S. It is important for policymakers to know if Saudi Arabia’s 
role as a swing producer can be used for political leverage to benefit or harm the U.S. The aim of 
the research is to show that Saudi Arabia plays a critical role as a swing producer in the oil 
market and that role has implication on U.S. national security.  
Chapter 2 examines how Saudi Arabia’s rulers mitigated internal and external 
destabilization threats, the role oil played on their various sources of power, and the threats 
posed by the unconventional oil revolution to their evolving security posture. This paper 
concludes that oil is an essential factor in maintaining internal and regional stability and that this 
source of power and therefore Saudi Arabian stability is under threat due to the unconventional 
oil revolution.  Instability in Saudi Arabia could damage its ability to use spare capacity in the 
short and long-term to manage supply disruptions, increasing risk to U.S. national security 
associated with oil price shocks. This paper further informs the global energy security field of 
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study by offering additional analysis on to the impact of the shale oil revolution on Saudi 
Arabia’s stability. 
A common theme that emerged from the first two chapters was disruptive changes in 
energy markets have the potential to produce geopolitical ripples.  In Chapter 3, I try to 
understand the secondary effects of a major shift in U.S. policy due to energy independence 
enhanced by shale oil. The aim of the paper is to contribute to the international security field of 
study by providing a greater understanding of the linkage between the global oil market and the 
Middle East region’s security dynamics. 
Ultimately, the most influential factor in determining the U.S. strategic interest and 
footprint in the Middle East is tied to economic security dependence rather than the physical 
supply of oil. Oil dependence caused the U.S. to get involved in unstable and hostile region.  
Domestic oil abundance will not end these involvements due to the importance of oil to the U.S. 
economy, and the transportation sector, in particular.  Instability in the Middle East will 
continue to pose economic risk to the U.S. and influence national security policy.  No matter 
how close the U.S. comes to self-sufficiency, volatility in the Middle East will remain a concern.  
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CHAPTER 1:  Why Does Saudi Arabia Acts as a Swing Producer in the 




This paper aims to define Saudi Arabia’s role as ‘swing producer’ and assess what it 
means in the context of a U.S. energy security framework. This thesis contributes to the field of 
energy security and further understanding of the link between oil dependence and U.S. national 
security by addressing the following research questions: Why does Saudi Arabia act as a swing 
producer in the global oil market and what impacts does it have on U.S. national security? 
Energy from natural resources is vital to human welfare, the progress of civilization, and 
the sustainable development of States. Energy Security is an important concept in global 
security studies because it links national security to the availability of natural resources for 
energy consumption.  Energy security challenges are very complex, dynamic, and pose a great 
multi-dimensional threat to all nations.  The modern world highly depends on fossil fuels for 
energy, especially oil.  Unfortunately, oil lacks easily available substitutes for its vast products.  
Disruption of oil supplies have detrimental effects on vital state functions such as food 
production, medical care, and internal security.   
Threats to energy security include manipulation of energy supplies by producers, 
competition over energy sources by consumers, and the reliance on foreign countries for 
energy. Complicating the latter energy security issue is the political instability of energy 
producing countries.  Evaluating and mitigating the vast and complex energy security threats 
requires a framework for understanding the dynamics and interdependencies of the global 
energy market, the relations between major producer and consumer countries, and states 
geopolitical interests.    
5 
 
Out of the various natural energy resources including fossil fuels, renewable, and 
nuclear, oil is the most important energy source to global security.  United States (U.S.) energy 
security focused on oil in World War II, when fear of fuel shortages threatened to contain 
German and Japanese operations.  Today’s U.S. energy security framework is still dominated by 
oil due to its strategic importance.  The U.S. consumes a quarter of the world’s oil yet it has only 
three percent of the world’s conventional oil reserves1. The majority of the globe’s oil is 
concentrated in the Middle East, a turbulent region where Saudi Arabia is the most dominant 
producer.  
With the largest crude oil reserves and production capacity, Saudi Arabia’s oil supply is 
critical to the world’s energy needs.  Saudi Arabia’s role in the global oil market is controversial 
and earns considerable attention by news media, energy experts, and policymakers. These 
groups commonly refer to the country with the distinction of ‘swing producer’  It is not clear 
that everyone understands the definition of swing producer and the role it plays in the global oil 
market, and more importantly, how it impacts U.S. national security.   
Realism, liberalism, and other international relations theories may interpret the reason 
Saudi Arabia acts as a swing producer differently. I hypothesize that Saudi Arabia uses its swing 
production role as an instrument of state power to maintain its position in the international 
geopolitical system and strengthen its balance of power and relationship with the U.S. 
The following outline for the paper is established. First, a short background on the field 
of study describing how Saudi Arabia came to its role in the oil market and a description of its 
production capabilities. The second part of the paper provides a literature review of the energy 
                                                          




security framework and Saudi Arabia’s oil policy with the aim of understanding the swing 
production role and how it lines up to the national security challenge. To understand how the 
role aligns with U.S. interests, the empirics section analyzes how Saudi Arabia’s swing 
production decisions align with U.S. national interests. This is fundamental to understanding the 
security implications associated with the role.   
The realism assumption is that Saudi Arabia normally makes swing production decisions 
aligning with its national interests.  Another possibility is that since Saudi Arabia depends on the 
U.S. security umbrella, the swing production decisions factor in U.S. interests. The extent those 
decisions are market driven versus U.S. interests is unknown.  The conclusion will provide 
analysis for reasons that would cause Saudi Arabia to shift swing production policy and choose 
its own interests over those of the U.S. 
There is substantial value in research that combines a stronger understanding of the 
connection between oil and political relationships to predict possible geopolitical consequences. 
This research is an essential foundation for the analysis and design of policies that promote U.S. 
energy security and reduce exposure to the consequences of oil influence and trade with Saudi 
Arabia.  
1.2 BACKGROUND 
The importance of oil to the world economy starts with its role in transport and 
petrochemicals.  Oil fuels the 650 million road vehicles on the planet, even the tires and the 
asphalt cars drive on comes from oil derivatives2. Global aviation is entirely dependent on jet 
kerosene, an oil derivative, which is required to keep the nearly 13,500 fixed wing passenger jets 
                                                          
2 Kenny, Niamh. 2011, “Energy Fundamentals: Understanding the oil & Gas Industries”. Energy 
Intelligence Research, Chapter 1. 
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flying3. The petrochemical industry is worth $2.9 trillion and is almost entirely oil derived.  Oil 
has so much importance to the world economy that it has fueled geopolitical rivalries and 
market share battles.  
No other commodity comes close to being as vital for the health and prosperity of the 
worldwide economy as much as oil, accounting for up to 10% of international trade4.  The 80 
million barrels per day (MBD) of oil produced worldwide amount to a global oil industry worth 
$240 billion per year5.  Oil also has secondary effects on the economy, having a major impact on 
currency movements and inflation, and other commodity prices.  Oil also plays a major role in 
food production; an oil crisis would disrupt the distribution of food causing industrialized 
countries to be out of food in their grocery stores within days6. 
The geopolitics of oil plays a dominant role in U.S. and global national security.  This is 
because many of the world’s leading oil producing countries are either politically unstable or at 
odds with the U.S.7, threatening the global oil market supply and therefore U.S. energy and 
economic security. Additionally, for all military powers including the U.S., oil plays a vital role as 
a source of fuel for forces on land, sea, and air. 
Oil is extremely political and global in its nature for several reasons8.  Oil played a key 
role in the industrialization process of the world, therefore governments and major world 
powers attempted to gain control over oil reserves domestically and abroad. Increasing the 
                                                          
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Kenny, Niamh. “Energy Fundamentals: Understanding the oil & Gas Industries”. Energy Intelligence  
Research (2011), Chapter 2. 
6 Green, B. M., 1978. Eating Oil - Energy Use in Food Production. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1978. 
7 The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 2004. The Geopolitics of Oil.  
http://www.iags.org/geopolitics.html. (Accessed April 19, 2013). 
8 The Gulf Oil and Gas Sector: Potential and Constraints, (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic 
Studies and Research, 2006), 201. 
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competition further is the fact that the large oil reservoirs have been overwhelmingly 
concentrated in a small number of countries, mainly in the Middle East.  In today’s globally 
integrated oil market9, Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest oil exporting nation and is the U.S.’s 
oldest energy producing ally in the Middle East. To understand the political role of Saudi Arabia, 
one needs to understand its economic role in the world’s energy market. 
Oil constitutes 90 percent of all transport fuels and 36 percent of the worlds’ primary 
energy demand,10 which underscores why oil and Saudi Arabia are important to the security of 
the world.  Saudi Arabia’s is the largest supplier in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), whose mission is to coordinate policies of the largest oil-producing countries 
in the world.  Saudi Arabia alone produces an average of 12 percent of total global production.  
In addition, Saudi Arabia has one-fifth of the worlds’ proven reserves, estimated at 262.5 billion 
barrels11.  Maintaining this high production and maximizing profit off their vast reserves requires 
vast oil infrastructure and a sound long-term production strategy. 
A crisis in Saudi Arabia would have detrimental effects on U.S. national security because 
it is a strategic ally in the oil-rich Middle East and a giant oil producer, unquestionably 
destabilize the global oil market and the region if the country destabilizes. The stability and 
reliability of Saudi Arabia as a supplier of oil to the world plays a vital role in global economic 
growth and the daily lives of billions of people relying on energy around the world. In 
preliminary research on the role of Saudi Arabia in the oil market, I found that many analysts in 
the oil industry and energy security fields referred to Saudi Arabia as a “swing producer”.  In 
                                                          
9 There is energy interdependence between producers and consumers all being inter-linked - what happens 
from an energy perspective in one place, can have knock-on implications elsewhere. 
10 Kenny, Niamh. 2011. “Energy Fundamentals: Understanding the oil & Gas Industries”. Energy  
Intelligence Research 
11 AlYousef, Nourah A. (2012) “The dominant Role of Saudi Arabia in the oil Market from 1997-2010”, 
Energy and Economic Development, Vol. 36, 2, in press. 
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previous literature, this role’s definition, expected behavior and boundary conditions are 
unclear.  In addition, definitions of this role are unsupported by historical evidence. This lack of 
information piqued my interest into researching why Saudi Arabia acts as a swing producer and 
investigating reasons the U.S. can expect a shift in oil policy.   
The empirics section first defines the characteristics and actions required to qualify as a 
swing producer.  Saudi Arabia’s production capabilities compared against the swing producer 
definition highlights its unique fit for the role. The security benefits this role provides Saudi 
Arabia and the U.S. are highlighted. The two allies face many threats from common enemies; 
the swing producer role fits in the strategic mitigation.  If the swing production role provides 
Saudi Arabia and the U.S. with security benefits, then it is important to analyze the security 
threats and implications if Saudi Arabia loses its swing producer status.   
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
While there is a vast amount of literature on Saudi Arabia’s oil supply and energy 
security, it does not assess the country’s importance to U.S. geopolitical security by acting as a 
swing producer in the oil market.  Energy security literature is the overarching subject to place 
this research under the proper overall framework and describe the main theoretical approaches 
to energy security in international relations (IR). The first part of this review will examine which 
theory of IR is best suited for the analysis of energy resources in IR.  The second part of this 
review will examine literature that aims to explain Saudi Arabia’s role as a swing producer in the 
global oil market.  This will set the stage for the empirics and analysis section to tie how Saudi 
Arabia’s role as a swing producer impacts U.S. energy security and ultimately national security. 
Since the oil shocks of the 1970s, energy security became integral for international 
relations theories.  Energy security differs from each State based on unique needs and status as 
an exporter or importer. For exporting countries, it means continuous access to international 
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energy markets for the sale of energy resources.  Meanwhile for importing countries, it means 
the assured access to a continuous supply of energy at affordable prices in order to maintain 
economic growth and social progress.  The secure supply of energy means protecting against 
disruptions including hedging against price volatility. 
Energy security is important to economic security because it guarantees the availability 
of energy supplies in a sustainable and timely manner at a price range that does not adversely 
impact the economy.  Energy security requires the cooperation and coordination among states 
to maintain a constant supply of energy for economic development.  Energy security is an 
integrated system trying to ensure the availably and reliability of energy resources.  
International relations theories related to energy security are somewhat of a 
controversial topic.  Dannreuther (2010) argues that despite the importance of energy in 
international relations, there are limited direct applications of IR theories to understanding 
energy-related conflicts12.  Today, there are few energy-related articles found in international 
security journals13, and the ones found cover policy-related issues, not IR theory. The scarcity of 
theoretical background is because energy security only recently became part of IR, making 
conducting research on energy security topics more challenging.     
Some scholars stick to the traditional IR theories to explain the energy security 
framework.  Belyi (2007) lists four approaches of energy security in IR theories – realism, 
liberalism, free trade, and balance of power14.  The realist approach is shaped by structural 
imbalances between energy producing and consuming regions and emphasizes the political 
                                                          
12 Dannreuther, Roland. "International relations theories: Energy, minerals and conflict." Polinares 8 
(2010): 1-24. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Belyi, Andrei V. "Energy security in international relations (IR) theories." Cathedra on political issues of 
international energy. Higher School of Economics (2007). 
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conflicts in connection to natural resources.  On the other hand, liberalism theory believes 
cooperation is possible through building institutions and that economic ties strengthen peace.  
Free trade movement of goods and resources allows market forces to control the market. 
Liberalism highlights the efficiency of international economic institutions on enhancing energy 
security, such as creating the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
The underlying theoretical assumptions of realism and liberalism theories applied to 
Saudi Arabia’s role as a swing producer can add to the understanding of implications on U.S. 
national security.  In realism, each country acts in its own self-interest in order to maximize its 
own survival and driven by accumulating as much power as possible.  Another relevant 
assumption realists make is that the distribution of resources between similar countries 
determines the balance of power between them.  States in this system balance against the rising 
powers and growing threats.   
The balance of power theory explains that states can choose to balance by allocating 
more resources internally to economic and military security or forming alliances with states with 
similar interests, including similar enemies. A power balance exists between energy producing 
and consuming States. This paper will focus on the balance of power between the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia through the swing production definition. 
Other scholars agree that while there is a growing interest in energy security and the 
impact of energy resources on IR, it lacks solid theoretical background in research15.  Cesnakas 
(2010) supports this further as energy security was previously not identified or analyzed in IR.  
                                                          
15 Česnakas, Giedrius. "Energy Resources in Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Approach." Baltic journal of 
law & politics 3, no. 1 (2010): 30-52. 
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Issues that emerged from energy resources were included in other elements of national 
security, mainly military security that is dominated by the realism paradigm.  
Cherp and Jewell (2011) depart from the traditional IR theories and suggest three 
distinct perspectives on energy security have emerged: the ‘sovereignty’ perspective with its 
roots in political science; the ‘robustness’ perspective with its roots in natural science and 
engineering; and the ‘resilience’ perspective with its roots in economics and complex systems 
analysis16.  The authors conclude that since today’s energy security challenges are complex and 
entangled, they must be analyzed using all three perspectives. 
Despite the lack of theoretical background in energy security, realism paradigm theories 
are a useful methodology in the studies of energy resources in foreign policy due to the fact that 
energy resources are material objects.  Realism suggests that energy resources are power 
elements included in states’ foreign policy when they seek to expand influence abroad. 
Understanding the principles behind swing production policies is necessary before it can be 
determined if they have an impact on U.S. energy security.  There isn’t vast academic research 
that pinpoints the definition of a swing producer or its impact on the U.S. security framework, 
with some academic papers occasionally mentioning the term as a byproduct of other Saudi-
related analysis. 
Bahgat (2003) describes why Saudi Arabia’s oil market conditions allow it to be a swing 
producer17.  One of the key characteristics of Saudi Arabia’s swing producer status is excess 
capacity.  Excess capacity allows Saudi Arabia to keep several MBD of idle capacity on hand for 
                                                          
16 Cherp, Aleh, and Jessica Jewell. "The three perspectives on energy security: intellectual history, 
disciplinary roots and the potential for integration." Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 3, no. 
4 (2011): 202-212. 
17 Bahgat, Gawdat. "The New Geopolitics of Oil: The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia." Orbis 47, 
no. 3 (Summer2003 2003): 447-461. 
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emergencies in the global oil market.  The government policy of Saudi Arabia seeks to act as a 
swing producer within OPEC by maintaining 1.5-2 MBD of spare capacity as a cushion18. Access 
capacity is not the only condition that defines the term swing producer.   
An additional characteristic highlighted by Maugeri (2012) is in times when the oil 
supply is short due to a global crisis, a swing producer has the capability and willingness to step 
in to increase production in less than 30 days and sustain that production for 90 days19.  This 
definition not only discusses physical capability like the previous definitions, but also adds a time 
variable defined over a finite period, and a willingness variable, which is highly subjective.  
Maugeri (2012) does not explain what determines Saudi Arabia’s willingness to stabilize 
oil markets using swing production. Does willingness have a relationship with policy decisions 
that have a direct impact on Saudi Arabian and U.S. interests?  At times, the tradeoff could 
mean balancing their interests versus that of friendly consumer nations who will be negatively 
affected if it does not execute its capability.  Maugeri does not expand on the willingness part of 
the definition in relation to Saudi Arabia’s oil policy and the consequences if it shifts away from 
swing production behavior.   
Other literature aims to understand Saudi Arabia’s oil policy but fails to compare it to 
historical and recent production behavior. Pierce (2012) analyzes the process of how the 
government of Saudi Arabia determines oil policy20.  The government applies both economic 
and political considerations to determine how much oil to produce, but when describing the 
policy of excess capacity, Pierce states the 2 MBD of excess capacity is underutilized for pumping 
                                                          
18 Saudi Arabia Oil & Gas Report. (2013), Business Monitor International Ltd. page 30 
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and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June 2012. 
20 Pierce, Jonathan J. 2012. "Oil and the House of Saud: Analysis of Saudi Arabian Oil Policy." DOMES: 
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more oil during surges in demand or supply interruptions. This is an economic consideration, but 
there are also political explanations found in other literature.  For example, Pierce (2012) 
concludes that oil production in Saudi Arabia is a function of Saudi Arabia’s estimates of how its 
oil reserves may provide long-term revenue and political stability at the risk of short-term 
economic gains.  Pierce provides further in-depth understanding and analysis of Saudi Arabia’s 
policy, but he does not tie it to the swing producer definition.     
The literature reviewed does not reveal what geopolitical factors causes shift in swing 
production policy.  There are disagreements between scholars on the connection between oil 
and international political relationships21. Some argue that consuming states tend to adjust their 
behavior in ways that are favorable to suppliers. For example, some assert that the U.S. modifies 
its behavior toward Saudi Arabia; examples include tolerance for democracy, human rights, and 
corruption.  A group of scholars argues that the U.S. makes these concessions despite the low 
volume of oil actually shipped between the two countries because of the central Saudi position 
in oil markets.  Other scholars question whether there is any strong empirical evidence for that 
assertion22.  
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
This paper uses a case study methodology to examine Saudi Arabia’s oil policy within 
the context of its swing producer role, comparing it to when it abandons that role, with the aim 
of understanding the cause from a U.S. energy security perspective. The geopolitical reasons 
why Saudi Arabia abandons its role is the independent variable is evaluated against the actual 
production decisions (dependent variable).  The production decisions are then compared the 
supply and demand conditions of the market.  If Saudi Arabia is behaving normally within a 
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balanced market, then it meets the role of swing producer.  If there are disruption and Saudi 
Arabia increases output, then it meets the definition.  In addition, if there is an oversupply and 
Saudi Arabia reduces production then it meets the definition.  If any of these conditions are 
present and Saudi Arabia acts opposite, then the assumption is that an explanation outside of 
the global oil market economics is the reason. 
The aim is to determine the importance of U.S. interest to Saudi Arabia when it makes 
the decision to play swing producer or not. The empirical section will help reach a reasonable 
conclusion to answer this research questions.  Oil market supply verses demand trends is the 
baseline for normal behavior. Saudi Arabia’s production decisions are expected to keep a 
balance in oil market supply and demand because it’s in its best interests to avoid shocks that 
spike prices or reduce demand.  However, I predict there are other factors that cause them to 
move away from maximizing economic benefit in place of geopolitical security.  
Oil prices depend on supply and demand because of geopolitical factors, determining 
the geopolitical factors that cause a shift in stated policy and historic behavior is a goal of this 
study. Examining geopolitical events that caused oil disruption versus the production decisions 
can explain which factors impact Saudi Arabia’s swing production policy.   Saudi Arabia’s stated 
policy provided in the literature review compared against actual production decisions should 
reveal variables that could have caused the abnormal decisions. This analysis will help uncover if 
there are ulterior motives or factors that can predict how Saudi Arabia will react in the future 
and how it impacts U.S. national security.  I suspect irrational behavior that breaks the swing 




1.5.1 DEFINITION OF A SWING PRODUCER 
There are two types of oil producers in the world: those who have the will and the 
means to affect market prices, and those who react to them23.  A swing producer falls into the 
category of the former.  A swing producer must meet the following criteria24:   
 They must be a net exporter of oil, with enough daily production, spare capacity and 
reserves to influence market prices by balancing supply and demand through increasing 
or decreasing output.   
 They must be able to act authoritatively and quickly to increase or decrease oil output.   
 They must have low production costs and the financial reserves to withstand reduced 
cash flow when restricting or increasing oil supply, necessary to balance the market.   
Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves are special for the following reasons: the massive volume 
available, the onshore location near deep water, the size and geology of the fields, and the 
geographical location of Saudi Arabia between Western and Eastern markets. This makes Saudi 
Arabia oil among the most desirable and cheapest in the world.    
What gives Saudi Arabia’s policymakers the capability to influence the oil market is the 
monstrous size of their crude oil production and refinement facilities.  By maintaining a cushion 
of spare production capacity, Saudi Arabia accepts taking a loss to support oil market 
stabilization. Having the ability to manipulate oil prices to help or hurt a regional rival is a 
powerful tool.  
                                                          





1.5.2 THE GEOPOLITICAL BENEFITS OF SWING PRODUCTION 
Saudi Arabia has a deliberate policy of maintaining prices at moderate levels and 
preventing excessive high prices because it serves their medium and long-term national 
interests. The benefits of being a swing producer include allowing Saudi Arabia to stabilize oil 
market prices, offset supply shortages, support domestic and foreign policy, and support U.S. 
foreign and security policy.  With all these potential benefits to Saudi Arabia and its allies 
including the U.S., the upside is they are a threat if Saudi Arabia ceases to be a swing producer. 
One of the biggest global threats if Saudi Arabia ceases to be a swing producer is oil 
price volatility.  In their research paper titled "Effects of oil price shocks on industrial production: 
evidence from some oil-exporting countries"25.  Oil supply shortages and skyrocketing prices 
lead to the development of alternative or competing energy sources, which would undermine 
the importance of petroleum.  Since petroleum is Saudi Arabia’s main resource of power, it is in 
the country’s interest to protect it.   
There are also reginal rivals to contend with where oil becomes a key tool.  In Iran, oil 
revenue streams finance domestic investment and fuel consumption booms and improve public 
welfare, which means cutting off these streams can hurt the country.  The Iranian economy is 
heavily dependent on oil revenues. Saudi Arabia is breaking their policy of oversupplying the 
market at a marginal loss, not only make up for Iranian oil, but also use oil as an offensive 
weapon to take Iran’s market share and revenue. This has served U.S. interests in containing 
Iran.  If, therefore, the implication to U.S. national security is if Saudi Arabia stops acting as a 
swing producer to counter Iran’s regional ambitions, U.S. influence is marginalized.  
                                                          
25 Mehrara, Mohsen, and Mehdi Sarem. "Effects of oil price shocks on industrial production: evidence from 
some oil-exporting countries." OPEC Energy Review 33, no. 3/4 (September 2009): 170-183. 
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Figure 1: Disruptions and losses to global oil supplies, 1956-201126 
 
Figure 1 shows the events that led to the major global oil supply disruptions and losses 
in MBD between 1956 and 2011. The first data point of interest in Figure 1 is the Arab oil 
embargo in 1973.  4.3 MBD were lost in the volatile global oil market, causing massive panic and 
huge price shocks.  Had the U.S. been a swing producer with significant excess production 
capacity, the Arab oil embargo would have been unsuccessful.  The ensuing price hikes led Saudi 
Arabia to build significant production capacity that it believed would allow it to take advantage 
of rising global oil demand27.   
Saudi Arabia inadvertently became the world’s swing producer when demand subsided 
in the early 1980s and the kingdom was stuck with substantial excess capacity. A new tool was 
available to confront the next major disruption in the oil market – the 1979 Iranian revolution. A 
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price shock occurred following the Iranian Revolution which shutdown Iran’s production and 
brought on a second price shock that doubled the price of oil from 1979-8028.  This second shock 
caused Saudi Arabia to interfere by increasing their exports, which partially offset this loss, 
bringing them to the forefront of a unique role within OPEC and the world oil market. 
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 was the next major disruption to the oil 
market. Oil production in Iran nearly stopped and Iraq’s oil production decreased dramatically.  
Consequently, economic recessions resulted in the U.S. and other major economies.  Saudi 
Arabia led the charge along with other OPEC countries to offset most of the decline resulting in 
only 4 percent decline in worldwide oil production29. The war shutdown a combined total of 6 
MBD of production. This prompted Saudi Arabia to maintain its export capacity at 10 MBD 
through 1981, representing 50% of OPEC’s exports.  This was the first significant time Saudi 
Arabia used its oil to positively impact the market. 
In 1985, Saudi Arabia cut oil exports 70% from their 1981 level to absorb global demand 
reduction.  After suffering significant revenue loss, Saudi Arabia abandoned the OPEC price-
setting, export-restricting strategy, and doubled their export levels30.  This sudden increase in oil 
supply backfired and caused global oil prices to fall sharply. 
After regrouping in the mid to late eighties, OPEC decided to adopt production quotas 
to gradually increase exports and recover market share.  The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990 interrupted this recovery, as both countries stopped exports.  Once again Saudi Arabia 
responded by doubling their exports within 6 months.   
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The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait became the next major disruption.  The disruption of oil 
supplies from these two countries caused a sudden oil price shock31. Nearly all of Kuwait and 
Iraq's oil production was taken offline immediately following the invasion. The peak lost 
production of about 4.3 MBD of combined Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude oil tested markets. Once 
again, Saudi Arabia responded by doubling their exports within 6 months32. Since then, Saudi 
Arabia maintained those export levels for nearly a decade until the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, 
when export levels adjusted in response to weakened market demand due to the global 
recession. The excess of supply over demand in the oil markets due to the Asian crisis caused a 
sharp decline in price during 199833.  
In 2001, Iraq suspended its oil production in an attempt to put pressure on the U.N. 
sanctions against the country34.  Iraq was under U.N. sanction since 1996 and could only ship 
crude oil to buy basic goods.  By halting exports, Iraq wiped more than two MBD off of world 
markets.  A day after the announcement, Saudi Arabia’s Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi gave his public 
reassurance that there would be no shortage in the market35. 
The 2002 Venezuelan strike disrupted two-thirds of Venezuela’s 3 MBD production.  The 
strike resulted in an increase in the world price of oil and affected the U.S. more than most 
other nations36.  The U.S. at the time received more than half of Venezuela’s crude and product 
                                                          
31 Energy Information Administration. “Effects of crude oil supply disruptions: how long can they last?” 
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exports and replacing the lost volume was difficult37.  Saudi Arabia had crude oil quality similar 
to Venezuela and increased production following the strike to offset Venezuelan losses38. 
The Iraq War in 2003 was a significant event for oil markets because Iraq contains a 
large amount of global oil reserves, with proven oil reserves of 112 billion barrels, ranking it 
second in the world behind Saudi Arabia.    Oil prices increased because the conflict coincided 
with an increase in global oil demand39.  At that time of war, the U.S. was importing 60% of its 
total oil imports40. The U.S. pressed Saudi Arabia to produce more oil, a request that was 
answered by producing at capacity41. 
The destruction to oilrigs off the U.S. Gulf Coast caused by hurricane Katrina in 2005 
caused a price spike in gasoline prices.  Saudi Arabia responded again by increasing production 
close to full capacity increasing their daily output by 1.5 MBD 42. The last dramatic disruption in 
the oil market came with a price increase with the break out of the Libyan revolution.  Saudi 
Arabia increased its production output to make up for the disruption to Libyan output.   
After analyzing the data behind the biggest major disruptions in the past decades, it is 
clear that Saudi Arabia played a significant role in minimizing oil price shocks. Reducing price 
volatility is another reason why Saudi Arabia maintains its swing production role. Keeping the oil 
markets calm is important to price stability.  Market economics state that if there is extra 
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supply, then price of oil goes down.  That hurts Saudi Arabia’s long-term strategy, so they could 
be selling as much as they can at the highest price possible now.  
1.5.3 ABANDONING THE SWING PRODUCER ROLE 
The examples presented above support Saudi Arabia’s role as the world’s most 
important oil supplier.  The cases analyzed show how the country has held a significant strategic 
role in the market, but there were times when Saudi Arabia refused to act as a swing producer.  
Figure 2 illustrates world events versus pricing and highlights two occasions when Saudi Arabia 
abandoned this role43.   
Figure 2: World Events and Oil Price Volatility 
 
                                                          




Figure 2 shows Saudi Arabia abandoned its swing producer role in 1985-86 by producing 
at full capacity, creating a huge surplus, which caused oil prices to collapse44.  So rather than 
meeting the first criteria of the swing producer definition identified in the beginning of the 
empirics section-a swing producer influences market prices by balancing supply and demand, 
Saudi Arabia continued increasing output in self-interest rather than global oil market interests. 
This change in behavior is explained by several historical reasons. OPEC decreased oil production 
almost in half from 1980 to 1986 in an attempt to artificially maintain oil’s high prices.   
By 1981, OPEC’s production was already surpassed by non-OPEC exporters and its own 
member nations became divided among themselves about production quotas45. Non-OPEC 
countries gained significant market share at the same time other OPEC countries began cheating 
on their production quota.  Saudi Arabia decided to increase production at full capacity to 
reclaim market share in self-interest.  In 1985, instead of keeping the market balanced as a 
swing producer, Saudi Arabia increased production and caused downward pressure on prices. 
Despite the market demand, Saudi Arabia fought to protect its market share by making 
competitors’ high-cost oil production facilities less profitable and in certain times even 
unprofitable46.  
1.5.4 THE THREAT FROM U.S. SHALE OIL  
The second time Saudi Arabia abandoned its swing producer role occurred in 2014 and 
is still ongoing at the time of this research.  Leading up to 2014, U.S. oil production began 
dramatically increasing since 2009 due to shale oil47.  Advances in drilling and extraction 
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technologies led to the emergence of the U.S. as one of the world’s largest producers of oil.  To 
illustrate this global oil market change, Figure 3 shows U.S. oil production versus Saudi Arabia 
since 200048. 
Figure 3: Oil Production - US Versus Saudi Arabia 
 
At the end of 2014, the U.S. almost produced as much oil as Saudi Arabia, up 70% since 
200849. The increases in the U.S. supply resulting from high shale oil production added to a 
worldwide surplus50.  In June 2014, oil prices dropped by a third as the U.S. continued to pump 
and global demand decreased.  Saudi Oil Minister al-Naimi blocked appeals from poorer OPEC 
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members for production cuts51. Although the U.S. energy requirements are domestically 
secured, forcing Saudi Arabia to abandon its role as a swing producer puts it at risk of suffering 
the repercussions of oil shocks in case of a major oil disruption.  A swing producer must be a 
low-cost producer.  The U.S. fails to meet this definition because the cost of producing most 
tight oil is around $80 per barrel52.  Saudi Arabia’s extraction cost is around $4-$5 per barrel53. 
1.5.5 IRAN’S RE-ENTRY INTO THE GLOBAL OIL MARKET 
While U.S. oil producers were already putting pressure on Saudi Arabia’s market share, a 
looming threat also began to surface.  Iran’s compliance with the nuclear agreements in April 
2015 resulted in the lifting of U.N. sanctions and the re-entry of Iran’s oil to the world market54. 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries believe that Iran is seeking to become the dominant 
regional power.  The nuclear agreement not only provides Iran with billions of dollars of frozen 
assets, but also enhances Iran’s political position55.  
As Iran resurges, Gulf countries fear this could be the beginning of the U.S. pivoting 
towards Iran.  Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries will not cut back their own oil production in 
order to surrender space for Iranian exports into Asia and Europe56.  How much additional oil 
the Iranians will or can bring into the market is going to be a critical topic which could spark 
geopolitical conflict. 
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1.5.6 ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
These two cases show that Saudi Arabia abandons its swing producer role by increasing 
production for the purpose of aggressively seeking to increase market share.  Unconventional 
shale oil may make the U.S. self-sufficient and reduce the price at the pump, but it cannot 
replace Saudi Arabia as a swing producer.  The price of oil may come down because of the 
increased supply, but when an oil crisis happens, there will not be a swing producer to save the 
world from price shocks, volatility, and supply shortages. This is supported by evidence 
presented above of the significant role Saudi Arabia has played over the past 35 years. 
Saudi Arabia claims to continue production until it is no longer profitable to produce (i.e. 
the price to extract oil becomes greater than the worth of the oil extracted), only then will oil 
production decline25.  Saudi Arabia claims it will not produce more oil when the marginal cost 
becomes greater than the marginal benefit, even though they have been breaking that policy by 
doing so over the past two years. Marginal cost exceeding marginal benefit was reported 
according to an article written by Arabic international newspaper Asharq al-Awsat in 2013.  The 
article reported that Saudi is enduring two years of production costs of the excess capacity to 
bring about required balance in the oil market57. 
The world oil market has been a matter of economic concern since the oil crises of 1973 
and 1979. OPEC quadrupled its price in 1973-74, which shocked the oil market and the world 
economy58. This price shock halted the surge in demand for OPEC oil and export quickly fell.  
This weak oil demand was very harmful to Saudi Arabia and OPEC as a whole. Causing a swing in 
oil prices the other way was a demand collapse, which was largely due to OPEC’s unwise 
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decision to maintain the 1979-80 price doubling, exacerbating a world economic recession, and 
a shift from oil use in electricity and heating59.   
Oil price shocks have a negative impact on the U.S. economy because oil makes up 70 
percent of U.S. transport fuels and 35 percent of its energy demand60.  There is an additional risk 
for the U.S. – there is a negative response of the stock market to oil price shocks when the price 
of oil rises due to an oil-market demand shock such as an increase in precautionary demand 
driven by concerns about future crude oil supply shortfalls61.  
Precautionary demand shocks can account for large declines in stock prices in the wake 
of major political disturbances in the Middle East62. Growing uncertainty about future oil supply 
can change quickly in response to political events or disturbances in the Middle East.  This may 
trigger an immediate and sharp increase in precautionary demand, which reflects by an 
immediate jump in the real price of oil as well as an immediate drop in stock prices63. 
Price shocks are similarly harmful to Saudi Arabia and negatively impact industrial 
production64. The results indicate a strong causality from oil price shocks to output growth for 
Saudi Arabia. Since oil revenues account for 90% of Saudi Arabia’s export earnings, 80% of state 
revenues, and 44% of the country’s GDP65, the kingdom is vulnerable to instability if prices or 
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demand becomes volatile.  Price shocks and other threats to the oil market management is 
necessary for the sake of global security.  
1.5.7 GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Geopolitical issues are causing Saudi Arabia to sacrifice maximum economic revenue. 
Claiming that Saudi Arabia is currently balancing the market is false because there is not a 
current shortage in the market requiring them to tap into the excess capacity. They have been 
breaking their policy by overproducing by 2 MBD for the last few years66. If Saudi Arabia 
continues to produce oil at a marginal loss, then they have changed their policy.  The oil market 
was already adequately supplied. Global oil spare capacity is probably at about 4 MBD 67. Only 
geopolitical and psychological factors can explain the departure of oil prices from economic 
fundamentals. 
Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (henceforth referred to as 
the Ministry) is the top decision making organization when it comes to country’s oil policy68.  
Keeping final oil production and price decisions with the ruling family (as opposed to the 
country’s state oil company, Aramco) allows Saudi Arabia to factor in political interests in 
addition to economic ones in its oil policy.  The King of Saudi Arabia chairs the Ministry, which 
includes board members composed of the most influential princes in the royal family. Saudi 
Arabia’s oil policy seeks to stabilize the global oil market by balancing supply and demand with 
its huge reserves, high production capacity, and spare capacity.  One of its key goals is to 
emphasize global cooperation, peace, and economic development and prosperity69.  
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The geopolitics of energy seen from a realism perspective using the use case of Saudi 
Arabia’s swing production role shows how state actors through the choices they make with 
respect to their resource endowment use and leverage it for power as actors.  Saudi Arabia’s 
position in the global oil market continues to be the country’s primary geo-economic tool, linked 
closely with the significant financial capital, which it uses for geopolitical influence. 
Realism theory tells us that Saudi Arabia will put its security interests above all others, 
even if it means they come at odds with the U.S. or if the global oil demand. Saudi Arabia needs 
more revenue to support their domestic policies or foreign affairs, if they would produce more 
oil, possibly negatively impacting OPEC’s interests.  
The Ministry has not commented on whether it will or will not use oil to influence 
geopolitical and regional outcomes.  Despite tense Iran-Saudi Arabia relations and the kingdom’s 
strategic alliance with the U.S. against Iran, the Ministry does not publicly mention using swing 
production to support U.S. policy against Iran at the sacrifice of economic benefit and harm to 
the global market.   
 Saudi Arabia balances conflicting interests between consuming and producing 
countries. Demand for cheap oil and the need for producing countries to accrue oil export 
revenue is a constant struggle. This balancing act leads to an internal tension between medium- 
and long-term interests but can tip a certain way due to geopolitical factors. Saudi Arabia’s 
geopolitical power is derived from its position in the world oil market and the role of oil on the 
nation’s economy23.   
 Saudi Arabia helps counter OPEC’s geopolitical influence.  Saudi Arabia acts like a 
balancing wheel to absorb fluctuations in supply and demand to maintain a monopoly price for 
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OPEC members70.  While this achieves long-term economic benefits for Saudi Arabia, it also 
gives them leverage to adopt a tit-for-tat strategy71 allowing it to punish excessive cheating by 
OPEC members.  More importantly, to the U.S., this also keeps members who are joint 
adversaries (such as Iran and Venezuela) in check so that they ca not use oil as a political 
weapon against the West. 
Saudi Arabia made a direct political move in oil production in April 2002 when Iraq cut 
oil exports to countries that supported Israel and called for an oil boycott72.   The goal of this 
move was to put pressure on the West and target the U.S. Saudi Arabia responded by raising oil 
production to counter the move and blatantly demonstrate to OPEC countries that oil was not 
to for use as a political weapon73. 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
Saudi Arabia uses its swing production role as an instrument of state power to maintain 
its position in the international geopolitical system and strengthen its balance of power and 
relationship with the U.S.  In the absence of geopolitical risks, Saudi Arabia’s policy exercises 
discipline in raising and lowering production to moderate price declines and spikes. Saudi Arabia 
maintains its strategic importance to the U.S. by intervening in the oil market to ensure 
moderate prices for the world economy.  However, this strategic role must balance Saudi 
Arabia’s other key objectives of keeping a large market share, counter geopolitical rivals, and 
keeping prices high enough for OPEC countries not to cheat their production quotas.     
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During geopolitical tensions within OPEC, Saudi Arabia uses swing production as a 
political instrument to punish producers for overproduction by flooding the market with oil.  
Saudi Arabia also stepped up to offset supply shortages by utilizing its excess capacity during the 
Iranian Revolution (1979), the Iran-Iraq war (1981), the Gulf war (1991), Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (2003), and the Libyan revolution (2011). Swing productions has allowed Saudi Arabia 
to influence OPEC decisions and discipline its members, i.e. project political power. Saudi Arabia 
used OPEC as a platform for increasing its prestige, protecting its interests, and translating its 
market power into international economic leverage.  Since OPEC has an influential impact on 
the size and structure of the oil market, Saudi Arabia made the cartel a key channel to 
implement its policy objectives. 
On the other hand, several cases presented previously illustrate the times Saudi Arabia 
refused to act as a swing producer.  Energy security for exporting countries refers to the 
continuous access to international energy markets for the sale of energy resources.  One of the 
ways to protect continues access is by protecting market share.  To protect its influence on the 
global oil market, Saudi Arabia protected its market share in 1985 against western producers, 
against the U.S. shale oil boom, and the possible Iranian re-entry into the global oil market.  
Geopolitical anxiety relating to a brewing major crisis with Iran explain the departure of 
oil prices from economic fundamentals in Saudi Arabia’s production decisions.  If Iran manages 
to take market share away from the Saudi Arabia, it could facilitate their rise in the region. Saudi 
Arabia skillfully uses oil as a political tool, sacrificing maximum oil revenue gains to keep 
domestic control by supporting social welfare programs.  Similar to its domestic policy, Saudi 
Arabia uses swing production as a tool in its foreign policy to counter Iranian interests and 
influence. Finally, the last reason I suspect deals with the advancement in unconventional oil.  
What is a bigger threat and thus has a bigger impact on Saudi Arabia’s swing production: 
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domestic consumption, foreign policy and geopolitics against Iraq and Iran, or unconventional 
oil’s impact on Saudi Arabia’s future oil revenue? 
Saudi Arabia is the only country capable of replacing lost supply for a meaningful period.  
However, its ability and willingness to act as a Swing producer varied in recent years and the 
fight for market share and requirement to meet its budget needs are a higher priority than 
pleasing oil producers and consumers. Despite actions to serve its self-interest, as an important 
U.S. ally, Saudi Arabia supported U.S. interests by stepping up many times in crises to offset 
losses and stabilize the global oil market, which the U.S. depends on74. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia 
have historically and continue to share the same regional stability goals. What remains unknown 
is as the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East change going forward as the U.S. begins to 
normalize relations with Iran, can Saudi Arabia still be relied on to promote U.S. interests in the 
region if it conflicts with its own. 
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CHAPTER 2: How Does The Unconventional Shale Oil Revolution Impact 
Saudi Arabia’s Stability? 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
The U.S. shale oil “revolution” has major potential to alter the global oil-market 
dynamics. Past prediction that the U.S. will surpass Saudi Arabia’s production and become the 
world’s oil kingpin by 2015 have not come to fruition75.  Nevertheless, shale has important 
implications on current conventional oil-producing countries, and the consequences for Saudi 
Arabia is investigated in this research. This research is important because the security and 
stability of major oil-exporting countries is a matter of great global concern due to the possibility 
of oil disruptions and price shocks.  Saudi Arabia’s oil production, which is dependent upon the 
country’s stability (and vice versa), is one of the most important actors in the global energy 
security framework. 
Recent technological innovations in hydraulic fracturing allow the recovery of 
unconventional oil from shale rock, boosting the size of U.S. oil reserves exponentially beyond 
previous estimates based on established conventional oilfields. Shale energy extraction, once 
considered economically unviable, experienced a boom due to drilling technology 
advancements and high oil prices. While the economic benefits might seem obvious, there are 
significant geopolitical consequences associated with shale oil extraction. The severity of the 
consequences of the new shale supply will vary for each oil producing exporting country. In the 
case of Saudi Arabia, this scenario means both economic and political impacts that significantly 
threaten the country’s stability and therefore the entire global energy security framework. 
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The revolutions of the 2011 Arab Spring overthrew and replaced long-standing 
autocratic regimes, but Saudi Arabia remained stable despite facing increasing domestic socio-
economic problems, religious tensions, and external threats76.  Oil played a major part in 
maintaining that stability.  This paper uses a use case method that examines how Saudi Arabian 
rulers mitigated internal and external destabilization threats, the role oil played on their various 
sources of power, and the threats posed by the unconventional oil revolution to their evolving 
security posture.   
This research finds that oil is an essential factor in maintaining internal and regional 
stability and that this source of power and therefore Saudi Arabian stability is under threat due 
to the unconventional oil revolution.  Instability in Saudi Arabia could damage its ability to use 
spare capacity in the short and long-term to manage supply disruptions, increasing risk to U.S. 
national security associated with oil price shocks. This research serves to further inform the 
global energy security field of study by offering additional analysis on to the impact of the shale 
oil revolution on Saudi Arabia’s stability.  
2.2 BACKGROUND 
The consequences of global oil depletion is a matter of great debate in the academic 
world and the petroleum industry77.  Many security experts fear more dire consequences: a 
worldwide depression would follow the peak in oil production as higher oil prices tends to bring 
down the world’s economy78. It’s difficult to predict peak oil because there are disagreements 
over the size of recoverable oil. Determining the specific time global oil peaks and eventually 
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runs out is difficult because of the uncertainty over the actual size of world oil reserves79. It’s not 
a major revelation for security analysts to predict Saudi Arabia would collapse once the oil runs 
out. However, what if there is an abundance of oil, what would happen to oil prices and how 
does that impact Saudi Arabia? 
Some experts refute the peak oil theory all together, arguing that world crude oil 
production decline fears are defunct because of the shale oil revolution, with potentially big 
consequences for oil supplies80. Maugeri (2012) affirmed that the world’s oil was neither 
running out nor approaching peak production81. Maugeri argues that due to the shale oil 
revolution, oil supply capacity is growing worldwide at such an unprecedented level that it might 
outpace consumption. Maugeri argues that if global oil production grows and if oil prices remain 
at or above $70 per barrel, there will be a significant dip in oil prices. One possible scenario is 
that the Shale revolution causes the oil prices to crash, thus taking away Saudi Arabia’s ability to 
maintain regional power externally and buy off dissent internally. 
The revolutions of the Arab Spring swept unrest that shook regimes across the Middle 
East and North Africa.  The changes in geopolitical dynamics as result of the Arab Spring made 
both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. nervous, which was evident by the urgency of the Saudi reaction 
which included brutal violence and spending hundreds of billions of dollars both domestically 
and abroad82. The threats from the Arab Spring will be more difficult to mitigate because of the 
shale oil revolution.  Saudi officials have downplayed the U.S. shale oil industry and its hefty 
supply to the market, emphasizing optimistic attitudes towards future growth due to Asian 
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demand83. Some Saudi princes believe that shale oil is not the immediate threat but that it’s 
necessary to diversify the sources of government revenue84.   
The shale oil threat become worse for Saudi Arabia when in December 2015, the U.S. 
passed a bill lifting the 40-year old crude-oil export ban85.  Prior to this bill, U.S. companies were 
prohibited from exporting crude oil due to past supply disruption fears86. The root cause of the 
law dates back to the 1973 oil embargo led by Saudi Arabia, when world prices soared and 
congress responded in attempt to limit U.S. exposure to the global crude market. Today, with 
the shale oil revolution, the changes to U.S. energy policy to export oil and reap the potential 
economic and geopolitical benefits which include having more influence in balancing world 
markets and achieving independence from oil imports87.   
2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This paper aims to research the connection between Saudi Arabia’s stability to the shale 
oil revolution. The literature review will focus on two main areas: Saudi Arabia’s sources of 
stability and the impact of the U.S. unconventional/shale oil revolution on that stability. The 
security and stability of Saudi Arabia is a popular subject among scholars and political scientists 
ever since the 1973 oil embargo.  After the late 2010 uprisings in the Middle East, scholars have 
reexamined Saudi Arabia’s regime stability in the context of their domestic challenges and 
regional reaction to the Arab Spring. There is a vast amount of literature discussing Saudi’s 
vulnerability to revolution once the oil wells run out, but minimal focus on the possibility of 
Saudi Arabia’s destabilization due to the shale oil revolution.  In fact, few scholars have 
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produced conclusive evidence on the impact of the shale oil on the global energy market and on 
oil producing countries in general.  
For Saudi Arabia’s sources of stability, their reaction to the Arab Spring is the case 
selected for study.  The literature review will examine research that analyzes the sources of 
power linked to regime stability in the Kingdom, including oil as a major source of power, and a 
possible weakness.  An important part of conducting the literature review is to research 
previous scholarly work examining the theory that Saudi Arabia is immune from revolution 
because of oil resource so that can be reexamined in the empirics while taking into account the 
shale oil revolution.  
Saudi Arabia is a rentier state: a state that relies on externally generated revenues 
(rents) rather than its population’s surplus production88. Rentierism creates a social contract 
between state and citizen very different from western-style democracies, which rely on taxation 
for the appropriation of social resources89.  In consequence, the population, sacrificing political 
representation for no taxation, and giving the state full control for the provision of their welfare, 
makes a trade-off90.  In Saudi Arabia’s case, this social contract is contingent upon the sale of oil 
for the government to withstand its financial burdens and distribute rents. 
The Saudi regime uses the principles of rentierism to provide capital to alleviate dissent 
in exchange for no taxes and other social support structures.  The source of this capital is oil 
revenue. Bowers (2013) discusses the economic risks of the “resource curse” which refers to the 
dependence of a rentier state on a limited natural resource that is its primary source of 
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income91. Bowers discusses why the key to buying popular support in Saudi Arabia is through oil 
wealth and the continuous oil revenues92. Bowers concludes that should significant losses of oil 
revenues occur, Saudi Arabia will become fiscally restrained from transferring funds and 
benefits to the population and will no longer be able to budget for it in the future93.  
Seymour (2012) predicts that due to several social, economic, and political problems 
that plague Saudi Arabia, the end of rentierism will occur in the next few decades94. The primary 
obstacles that Seymour predicts will collapse rentierism are the lack of economic diversification 
and the extreme dissent from the population including the religious establishment against the 
ruling family95.  These same obstacles are analyzed in the empirics with the addition of the 
amplified pressure brought on by the shale oil revolution. 
Stenslie (2012) examines the structure of political power inside Saudi Arabia with the 
focus on how the regime copes with overcoming internal challenges96. Mikstas (2012) also 
assess Saudi’s stability be identifying and examining several sources of its power including 
claiming political legitimacy, using Islam, and depending on oil revenue economically97. Both 
scholars conclude that despite many destabilizing factors in Saudi Arabia, the flow of oil wealth 
was the main factor that enables the regime to remain stable for the foreseeable future. The 
authors don’t consider the impact of additional oil market supply or price drops on the 
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government’s budget.  I predict the resulting limitations on rentierism and instruments of power 
used domestically and externally to counter threats that could undermine Saudi stability.  
Robinson (2012) argues that oil states are vulnerable to instability if there is a sustained 
interruption of rents98. Robinson presents the case of oil-poor Arab countries Tunisia, Egypt and 
Yemen who underwent regime change in contrast to oil-rich states such as Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman who have witnessed relatively little turmoil99. Mason (2012) 
analyzes how Saudi uses its oil policy to maintain security and stability100. Mason argues that 
Saudi Arabia needs to maintain sustainable oil supplies to its allies while leveraging its oil 
reserves against adversaries such as Iran to implement its foreign policy101.  Mason presents 
evidence that shows how an increase in oil revenue led Saudi Arabia to a more active foreign 
policy and the use of its economic power in alliance with the U.S. to limit the strength of its 
adversaries in the region102.   
Mason examines various economic weaknesses threatening Saudi Arabia should oil 
prices fall significantly.  Mason found that during the Arab Spring in 2011, oil accounted for 80% 
of government budget revenues and 90% of export earnings, highlighting the country’s survival 
is dependent on one resource.  During that same year, Mason aggregates the total government 
funds redistributed to Saudis in increased social benefits to be around $40 billion.  The budget 
surplus from the high oil prices, which averaged over $110 per barrel, enabled the government 
to provide the economic package, compelling the population to accept their condition. 
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A recurring theme in the literature is how the Saudi regime keeps the internal 
population stable through a variety of tools resourced by oil revenue. The Arab Spring gave 
scholars a contemporary case to study and test theories of Saudi Arabia’s stability and sources 
of power.  Badreddine (2013) examines the work of academics trying to identify why the Arab 
Spring did not transpire to the gulf region specifically103.  In researching the mechanisms Saudi 
Arabia used to survive the Arab turmoil, Badreddine found that in addition to rentierism, the 
Saudi regime utilized structural repression and violence against the majority of the society104. Oil 
wealth also allowed the regime to buy off people through a series of spending sprees, which 
included increased wages for the public sector and welfare initiatives to alleviate poverty and 
unemployment105.  
Religion and cultural norms also play a role in maintaining stability.  For external 
influence, Badreddine showed that Saudi Arabia used part of its oil surpluses to fund Islamist 
groups as a way to increase its importance in regional and international politics106. There is 
additional literature that explains in how Saudi Arabia used revenue to suppress the Arab Spring 
in other regional countries. 
Jones (2011) theorizes that Saudi Arabia is determined to crush the Arab Spring at home 
and throughout the region107.  Jones describes actions that Riyadh took to get out in front of the 
revolutionary movements in Yemen, Syria, Egypt (post Mubarak), Morocco, and Jordan, 
including detailing hundreds of billion in domestic incentives and regional ally support Saudi 
used to crush the mounting campaign of public dissent.  Jordan theorizes that the wealth from 
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the flow of oil revenue is the source of Saudi Arabia’s political influence, but he doesn’t 
speculate on threats to this source of power. 
Patrick (2013) discusses the mutual reliance on each other’s survival that Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan share108. Both countries share the same strategic threats of containing the regional 
influence of Iran, countering the Muslim Brotherhood as alternative from of Islamist 
government, and the destabilizing effects of the Syrian refugee spillover into Jordan.  A Saudi 
gift of $1 billion in 2011 to Jordan as a tool to elicit policy responses and provide relief.  Patrick 
argues that any dramatic change in Syria will require more funding from Saudi Arabia to Jordan 
to ensure Jordan’s survival.  Such gifts to ensure survival or regional allies will be difficult for 
Saudi Arabia to grant if there is significant damage to oil revenue. 
Although shale oil sent shockwaves across the U.S. energy sector and is very popular 
among investors, there is still considerable discussion surrounding its ability to replace the 
dependence on conventional oil supplies on a global scale. The energy return on energy 
invested is worse for all unconventional oil production methods than for conventional oil, so the 
price of an oil barrel must be very high in order for producers to use expensive fracking 
procedures to extract the oil, requiring around $80 a barrel to cover the costs of extraction.  
There are also environmental concerns related to the fracking process, which pumps a complex 
mixture of toxic chemicals deep underground under extreme pressure.   If shale extraction 
spreads across the globe, it could potentially poison lakes, streams, and aquifers that local 
communities depend on.   
Aside from the large environmental risks of unconventional oil, some experts just don’t 
believe the hype surrounding its promise. Hughes (2013) makes the argument that the 
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production of shale as and oil in the U.S. is overhyped and the costs are underestimated109.  
Plumer (2012) argued as long as domestic fields keep declining, total U.S. supply would decline 
because the shale boom isn’t enough to replace it110.  There are concerns that shale oil fields 
can’t hold up their current production rates.  Hughes (2013) examined the life span of shale 
wells and his research showed that the newest wells aren’t as productive as those drilled in the 
first years of the unconventional oil boom111.   
The literature reviewed highlights that there is a wealth of research and knowledge on 
Saudi Arabia’s stability and the actions of the regime to contain the Arab Spring.  The strategic 
use of oil wealth is one of the primary factor in keeping the Saudi regime and its allies stable 
while countering the influence of its regional adversaries.  What is lacking in the literature is the 
extent of the impact the shale oil revolution will have on the Saudi regime cash flows and how a 
significant reduction in revenue flows impacts the strategic spending on domestic and regional 
stability efforts. 
2.4 METHODOLOGY 
This research will use a case study method that will concentrate on the events of the 
Arab Spring. The period surrounding the Arab Spring is selected because the Saudi regime felt 
threatened by the events and was determined to crush the uprisings both at home and 
throughout the region by pursuing the path of counterrevolution. The investigative process will 
involve the collection of data correlated to Saudi Arabia’s stability and U.S. shale oil.     
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The empirics section will examine how the Saudi regime operated differently from the 
other countries that fell victim to the Arab Spring revolutions and how other factors supported 
by oil revenue may contribute to that stability.  A fundamental question to instigate is how do 
the Saudis in their approach to counterrevolution strategically use oil?  This will include looking 
at cases where the use of funds to promote stability in response to many of the Arab-state 
uprisings.   
Once the link between oil and stability is established, I will inquire into the 
consequences of the oil revenue loss resulting from unconventional oil, the breakdowns in the 
stability status que that will increases the risk for revolution. To understand the impacts in the 
empirics section, I will conduct a budget analysis of Saudi Arabia’s annual sources of revenues 
and expenses as they relate to oil and stability.   
2.5 EMPIRICS 
2.5.1 SOURCES OF POWER AND STABILITY 
Saudi Arabia’s soft and hard power is based on outmaneuvering political transformation 
or even calls for it, on preserving a system of political economic privilege in which the ruling 
class benefits, on high returns on the sale of oil, and on unleashing the forces of radicalism and 
sectarianism to insure the survival of the kingdom's ruling family112.  Money from oil export is 
the common denominator that sources and enables the various internal and external strategies 
employed by Saudi Arabia’s rulers113. 
2.5.2 OIL REVENUE 
Since its discovery, oil has been at the heart of Saudi power and influence. The oil 
wealth helps shape social, economic, and political relations, which are dominated by the 
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regime114.  Oil wealth is passed along in a numerous social welfare programs that include free 
education, free health care, sweeping employment support, subsidies for industry and business, 
and even the provision of copious amounts of water115.  Water is particularly important 
considering Saudi Arabia is one of the most arid places in the world. The ability to sustain the 
privilege and the social and political relations enabled by oil wealth is dependent on the ability 
to generate high revenues from oil116. High oil prices are necessary to sustain the domestic 
political system and the patronage that fuels it, as well as the kingdom's hegemony in the 
region.  
Oil prices fell because of unconventional oil supply, making it more expensive for Saudi 
Arabia to use funds to leverage the same level of power. Buying power and influence requires a 
steady and profitable source of revenue, a source that is diminishing as oil prices fall. While oil is 
the second most abundant liquid on the planet after water, Saudi Arabia used it as an engine of 
wealth by carefully keeping production limited.  Saudi Arabia and other OPEC countries will not 
be able to continue manufacturing this scarcity once an excess supply of oil is available on the 
market because of shale oil. 
Oil wealth is also used by Saudi Arabia to cultivate layers of foreign investment and 
support117. The American military complex in particular has benefited from bigger oil prices118. 
The Saudi regime has regularly spent upward of ten percent of its annual oil revenues, often 
over $10 billion a year, in the acquisition of arms and munitions119. These arms are usually not 
used in regional conflict (with the exception of Yemen), but rather in the oppression of domestic 
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opposition120.  American energy independence as a result of unconventional oil will therefore 
hurt the domestic security forces; the kingdom's counterrevolutionary authorities that have 
benefited by the American-Saudi military relationship.121 
2.5.3 RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE  
With the fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, and with unrest breaking out on their 
borders in Bahrain and Yemen in February of 2011, the Saudi regime began to feel threatened. 
When calls for public dissent began to mount in Saudi Arabia, the regime began to undertake 
counterrevolutionary measures. Saudi Arabia's leaders sought support from the religious 
establishment, which met their call by declaring public protests un-Islamic.  The clergy was 
rewarded for their support with a $120 billion financial package to include funding for more 
mosques, religious schools, and religious police122.  Also in their interest, the regime amended 
an already strict press law criminalizing criticism the royal family to include the official religious 
establishment123.  
The religious police (previously had its role eroded), was re-empowered and began 
streaming into the streets, radio, and television to counter calls for reform124. The religious 
establishment launched a malicious counterrevolutionary campaign of their own which 
demonized democracy and its supporters125.  In the first few months of 2011, Saudi Arabian 
rulers limited the potential power of protest movements by unleashed the forces of religious 
zealots, who share the Saudis' abiding investment in preserving the political status quo and in 
preventing the realization of democratic transformation126. In March 2011, prominent members 
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of the clergy officially denounced public dissent as un-Islamic because protests would lead to 
sedition and threatens unity of the Muslim community127.  By forging a religious-political 
alliance, the official religious establishment has derived great advantages from the Saudi 
regime128.  For now, oil revenues allowed the regime to provide a financial package to the 
religious establishment to keep them focused on the citizens, and turn a blind eye towards the 
ruling regime. 
2.5.4 RESPONSE TO INTERNAL POLITICAL THREATS  
De-politicization and disenfranchisement of Saudi Arabian citizens’ fuels dissent. The 
country has a closed political system with al-Saud rulers sitting on top. Saudi citizens enjoy few 
political rights and exert little influence in domestic and foreign affairs. To make up for the small 
base for their power and avoid the possibility of resistance because of political marginalization, 
the ruling elites have historically redistributed oil wealth as a way to assimilate potential 
dissidents. The Saudi regime’s contract provides benefits for its citizens in exchange for their 
obligatory concession is showing signs of strain.   
There are significant economic disparities, public services are inadequate and 
desperately needed infrastructure projects are without exception always delayed due to budget 
deficits and corruption129.  Saudi Arabia’s population is young and suffers from unemployment 
problems: two-thirds of the population is under 30 of which at least 30% is unemployed130.  
Disgruntlement became visible during the 2011-2012 protests when thoughts of Saudis took to 
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the streets demanding political liberalization and an end to corruption and programs to tackle 
unemployment.    
The rentierism social contract appears to be eroding as the calls for political reform 
become more clamorous. The calls for political reform include increasing political representation 
and greater political accountability. The calls for political reform are tensions at the heart of 
Saudi society, which manifest themselves in the form of opposition to the regime. A major 
internal problem in Saudi Arabia is unemployment amongst young Saudis. The unemployment 
rate of young Saudis between the ages of 20 and 24 is at staggering 39 percent131.  
Economic disparities between rulers and there bureaucrats, and the average citizen is a 
point of major political friction within Saudi society. Saudi Arabia faces several other serious 
challenges besides unemployment, notably the question of succession.  The topic of succession 
is beyond the scope of this paper but deserves research on its own, for it is a possibly a bigger 
threat than unconventional oil to Saudi Arabia’s stability. 
These major internal problems were temporarily mitigated thanks to the quick-fix use of 
oil revenue. After the Arab Spring spread from Tunisia to Egypt into other Arab countries, Saudi 
Arabian rulers moved decisively to crush those inclined to mount a campaign of public dissent 
inside Saudi Arabia. In dozens of places, hundreds of protesters routinely assembled, calling for 
relatively minor concessions, including greater religious tolerance and the release of Shiite 
political prisoners. At the time of the Arab Spring, King Abdullah offered up over $100 billion in 
domestic incentives to keep people from protesting in the streets. He also ordered thousands of 
security forces to close off spaces for public assembly and to make clear that the penalties for 
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unrest would be severe. With a mounting budget deficit because of unconventional oil, Saudi 
Arabia would not have enough revenue to provide such domestic spending to keep people from 
demonstrating in the streets. 
2.5.5 RESPONSE TO ARAB SPRING REVOLUTION THREAT  
This protests across Tunisia and resulted in an overthrowing of their President Ben Ali in 
January 2011.  The people of neighboring Arab states felt empowered and began calling for 
change within their own countries.  Saudi Arabia began losing powerful regional allies such as 
Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, which began to change the balance of power in the Middle East. Saudi 
Arabia used its power yielded from oil revenue to get out in front of revolutionary movements in 
other neighboring countries132.  Saudi Arabia used its regional power against movements in 
Yemen and Syria to preserve the political status quo in both places. It has also provided 
monetary support to the under stressed monarchies in Morocco and Jordan. In the post-
Mubarak Egypt, Saudi Arabia has provided billions of dollars of aid in an effort to shape the 
political outcome there and support the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Another source of concern is the continuing Syrian conflict where Saudi Arabia funded 
Islamist opposition to the Assad regime133.  There is evidence of Saudi Arabia backing any group 
opposing Assad including al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front134.  Saudi citizens are also one of the 
largest foreign fighters joining ISIL.  These fighters pose a threat of returning to attack the 
Kingdom.  Recent headlines show ISIL claimed responsibility for recent attacks inside Saudi 
Arabia. 
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The Muslim Brotherhood is a threat to Saudi Arabia’s religious power because it offers 
the Muslim world a political Islam alternative to Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi version.  Saudi Arabia 
views all political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, as a threat to the ruling family, 
therefore outlawing the formulation of any political party in the country. By 2011, the post-
revolutionary struggle for power was underway in Egypt. There were indications that Saudi 
Arabia was meddling: money from Saudi religious organizations was used to finance emerging 
conservative religious political networks135. Egyptian Salafis, who embrace an orthodoxy similar 
to that of the Wahabbi religious establishment of Saudi Arabia, embraced the Saudi national flag 
as their most important political symbol.136  Thanks to oil revenue, Saudi Arabia was able to 
finance an opposition group in Egypt that eventually toppled Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood from power. 
In Bahrain, when pro-democracy protesters first mobilized to press for political reform 
in mid-February 2011, over fifteen hundred members of Saudi Arabia's National Guard poured 
over the causeway into the tiny island country which sits just a few miles off of Saudi Arabia’s 
eastern shore.  The Armed security forces responded brutally, violently attacking tens of 
thousands of peaceful protesters.  In the merciless crackdown that followed, dozens of pro-
democracy activists were killed, thousands were arrested, disappeared, and tortured137. With 
the sweeping changes underway across the region, Saudi officials knew that if the protests in 
Bahrain were allowed to succeed, a democratic state next door controlled by a Shiite majority 
would lead to catastrophe because it would unite with the local Shiite population and Saudi 
Arabia’s regional rival: Iran. 
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The origins of Saudi-Iranian geopolitical hostility derive from the Iranian Revolution and 
the rise of political Shi’ism138. Ayatollah Khomeini, a charismatic Shiite cleric who was 
instrumental in the fall of the Shah, called repeatedly for the overthrow of the Al Saud during 
the 1980s139. While Shiites constitute the majority of Iran's population, in the rest of the Persian 
Gulf, they are a marginalized minority. In both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, Shiites are shut out of 
power, discriminated against by Sunni political elites, and subjected to the worst kinds of 
oppression and abuse. After the Iranian Revolution, Shiites in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain began to 
agitate against their rulers, sometimes violently. Over the next two decades, in addition to 
empowering Islamic radicals in Central Asia, Sunni leaders encouraged virulent forms of anti-
Shiite sectarianism to counter Shiite empowerment.140 
Over the course of the protests, Saudi leaders declared publicly, and always without 
evidence, that Iran was directly responsible for the "destabilization" of its closest neighbor141. 
The accusations against Iran distracted attention from the democratic substance of the 
protesters' message and sought to recast them as radicals who threatened to upend security 
and stability close to home142.  Security forces and secret police identified pro-democracy Shiite 
activists as Iranian agents143. Anti-Iranian fear mongering successfully played upon U.S. and 
Israeli anxieties about Iran's potential power in the region144.  
The U.S. gives first priority to protecting the petroleum-based political status quo in the 
Persian Gulf; it was always unlikely that the U.S. would intervene against Saudi Arabia or on 










behalf of any pro-democracy movement in the region145. Since the calls for political 
transformation came from within oil-rich Saudi Arabia and Bahraini the U.S. just ignored them. 
With unconventional shale oil, the U.S. will not have the need to protect the petroleum-based 
alliance and any anti-Iranian rhetoric without solid evidence will be no excuse for tyranny.  The 
U.S.-Iranian relations are already warming up at the discontent of the Saudi regime.  The U.S. 
will have more political leverage to engage in more cooperation with Iran once unconventional 
oil sets the U.S. free from major energy producers.    
2.5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS- WATER SHORTAGE 
Renewable groundwater and surface water supply are limited while demand for water is 
growing rapidly146. Water scarcity is a major problem also because water has a connection to 
energy production and use. Saudi Arabia must use domestic oil for desalination, causing less 
revenue for government.  Due to the rapid depletion of groundwater, Saudi Arabia relies on 
desalination for domestic, industrial and agricultural water requirements. The use of energy to 
generate water eats away export revenue funds. Saudi Arabia is the third-largest per capita 
water user worldwide and addresses this problem of domestic demand primarily through 
desalination and the abstraction of non-renewable groundwater, both of which are extremely 
problematic environmentally and economically costly147. Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s most 
water-stressed countries. Lack of water resources in Saudi is a looming security concern as the 
country receives little rainfall and has limited underground or other reserves.  
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Saudi Arabia subsidies the desalination and abstraction of water as part of its rentierism 
social contract with the population. The country maintains 27 desalination plants to support the 
growing demand of water and the government has allocated around $7 billion on water related 
projects in 2013148.  Saudi Arabia will struggle to maintain this budget once U.S. unconventional 
oil floods the market. With a growing population predicted for the future, the need for more 
sustainable water security will be a struggle for the Saudi regime and will cause the rentierism 
social contract to break.  
2.5.7 ENERGY THREATS- DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION & LACK OF RENEWABLE 
ENERGY  
Saudi Arabia’s oil market position and leverage is under threat by various challenges.  
Domestically, booming oil demand threatens to cannibalize exports149.  The countries crude oil 
consumption rose by 6% annually over the last decade150.  This consumption is fueled by a 
growing populations demand for transport and increased electricity generation from oil151.  
These excessive consumption rates are encouraged by the oil subsidies provided as part of the 
social contract in the rentier model. Total domestic crude burned for power generation is on 
track to reach 1MBD within 5 years, 10% of the country’s current output152.  If a budget deficit 
continues past Saudi Arabia’s reserve funds, government cuts will come from domestic oil 
subsidies, which will disturb the social contract. 
Domestic oil consumption is another related issue in Saudi Arabian resource 
mismanagement because of rentierism and government subsidization. The rapid growth of 
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Saudi Arabia’s domestic oil consumption, a nine-fold increase in 40 years, to nearly 3 million 
barrels per day; about one-fourth of production is having an impact on exports and revenue as a 
result153. Such rapid growth in consumption–5.7% annually, which is 37% faster than its income 
growth of 4.2%–will challenge Saudi Arabia’s ability to increase its oil exports154.  The domestic 
energy mismanagement in Saudi Arabia is a result low interest in renewable, unmotivated by 
huge quantities of crude oil and natural gas reserves155.   
Heavy domestic oil consumption is a major problem, which is untamed, but affordability 
is important for social welfare therefore energy is subsidized, similar to the water security 
dilemma.  Domestic energy and water subsidy will not be affordable once U.S. unconventional 
oil starts competing for market share.  If Saudi Arabia’s budget deficit increases, it will be unable 
to subsidize energy, adding pressure on the population that will struggle to keep domestic 
discontent quite. 
2.5.8 DUTCH DISEASE 
Saudi Arabia makes the mistake of equating oil abundance with oil security and ignores 
the implications of tying its economic fate to energy.  A new analysis by Securing America’s 
Future Energy (SAFE) determines a country’s Oil Security Index by considering its dependence on 
oil, economic exposure to oil price changes, and physical oil supply in order to assess the full 
picture of its oil security156. The report’s results for Saudi Arabia and the U.S. a warning to 
policymakers that an enormous supply of energy resources is marginalized by bad policy.  The 
U.S. ranks fifth out of 13, bolstered by the shale oil supply but is vulnerable to oil price changes 
due to high consumption and lack of fuel diversity.  Saudi Arabia ranked last; the advantages of 
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vast reserves and low production costs lose to high levels of spending on oil, inefficient 
consumption, and dependence on oil revenue.  The conclusion is domestic energy resources are 
a tremendous advantage, but the road to affordable and secure energy is not paved with oil 
wells alone157. 
2.5.9 BUDGET PROBLEMS 
Poor fiscal planning, waste, corruption, and a lack of transparency plagues Saudi 
Arabia’s budget.  In 2014, for the first time since 2005, the Council of Ministers endorsed a 
balanced budget158.  Saudi Arabia is feeling budgetary pressure because of the threats posed by 
the Arab Spring, and the intervention in Syria and Yemen.  The government expanded spending 
since the Arab Spring with the intention of continuing to stimulate the economy.  A considerable 
rise in domestic spending and the expansion of the patronage networks that kept dissent 
controlled is becoming considerably more expensive to maintain.  
Government spending of $66.13 billion will support economic growth and provide 
encouragement and opportunities for the private sector159.  The economy would collapse 
without government stimulation, which is heavily dependent on oil.  Oil revenues account for 
90% of total Saudi Arabian export earnings, up to 80% of state revenues, and at least 44% of the 
country’s GDP160.  Analysts estimate a price of $67 per barrel for Saudi export crude and 
production of 9.4 million barrels per day in order for the revenue to be consistent with the 
budget.  If U.S. unconventional oil takes any of that market share away, or the surplus in global 
supply causes the market price of oil to drop, the budget will suffer. Despite the increase in 
global demand in 2013, OPEC’s share of 29.9 million b/d is 400,000 b/d beneath demand for the 
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group’s oil last year161. This trend will continue if the U.S. decides to export unconventional oil, 
resulting in OPEC and Saudi Arabia loss of market share. 
If the available Saudi government budget is reduced, then the question becomes where 
will the cuts come from and where will the spending continue?  Will the regime sacrifice the 
purchase of arms or the social spending?  To begin to predict the Saudi regime’s tradeoffs, it’s 
important to gain a better understanding of the fiscal budget breakdown162: 
Table 1: Saudi Arabia’s Governmental Spending 
Expense % of Total Spending 
Education and Manpower 25% 
Health and Social Affairs 12.9% 
Transport and Infrastructure 7.9% 
Water and Agriculture Infrastructure 7.3% 
Municipality Services 4.6% 
Defense and Security Undisclosed163 
 
Saudi Arabia’s oil-dependent budget and economy are affected by oil price, one if not all of 
these budgetary expenses will likely shrink. 
With the Shiite crescent stretching from Iran to Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood brewing 
underground in Egypt, trained jihadists returning from Iraq and Syria, its enemies from East to 
West, inside and out surround Saudi Arabia.  Defense spending, the main source of military 
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power will likely not shrink. Defense spending is secretly incentivized by kickbacks and 
corruption for the ruling elite, so all other budgetary items supporting the common citizen will 
likely shrink first.  Referring back to the principles of rentierism where the population sacrifices 
political representation as long as the state provides welfare, once those pieces of the pie 
shrink, the pieces that provide for the welfare of the population, the social contract breaks, 
resulting in a high risk of destabilization. 
U.S. shale oil could be a paradigm-shifter for the global oil market because it could alter 
its fundamental features.  Since the oil market is adequately supplied, excess capacity could 
cause a downward readjustment in price, which could slow U.S. unconventional production and 
diminish Saudi Arabia’s revenues.  Energy policy between the world’s largest energy consuming 
nation and its oldest energy-producing ally needs to be carefully managed. This requires an in-
depth analysis of all the environmental and energy threats concerning unconventional oil to the 
U.S. and Saudi Arabia, after which we will present an integrated policy options from a U.S. 
perspective to ensure mutual benefit for both countries.   
Without careful coordination between the two allies, a geopolitical battle could spur up 
with unknown consequences ranging from Saudi Arabia retaliating by driving prices down to 
protect its market share before the U.S. could rev up its shale oil policy, to the U.S. 
unintentionally destabilizing Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia pledged $130 billion to various 
domestic-social programs in the early weeks of the Arab Spring. Robinson argues that oil still 
matters in regime stability because the more rents a regime has at its disposal, the more likely it 
can survive periods of dissent.  While the amount of oil reserves Saudi Arabia has prolonged the 
regime, if price falls because of an oil surplus, government revenues will fall significantly and 
Saudi won’t be able to fund domestic programs that keep dissenters quite. 
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There is a possibility that the unconventional oil revolution started in the U.S. is 
replicated elsewhere from Argentina to China and beyond164.  If these countries gain the 
capability to extract shale at the same time the technology improvements lower the extraction 
breakeven costs, these factors would exacerbate the threat to Saudi Arabia’s stability by hurting 
its exports to these countries and the required oil revenues to maintain stability. Table 2 
illustrates which countries Saudi Arabia’s $306B worth of exports in 2014 went to165, with oil 
accounting for nearly 90% of central government fiscal revenues and over 85% of export 
revenues166: 
Table 2: Saudi Arabia's Top Export Partners' Shale Reserves 
Country Percentage of Saudi Arabia Exports167 
Estimated Shale Reserves (billion 
barrels)168 
China 14% 32.2 
Japan 14% U.S. supply 
U.S. 14% 58 
South Korea 11% U.S. supply 
India 9.8% 3.8 
Singapore 4.4% U.S. supply 
France 2.8% 4.7 
Spain 2.1% 0.1 
Italy 1.7% EU supply 
Remaining 26.20% 320.1 
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With a  U.S. pivot to Asia to supply China’s regional rivals, Saudi Arabia could potential 
lose over 74% of its export revenue of oil to countries that could adequately be energy 
dependent, and leaving almost as much reserves for the world as Saudi Arabia has total. Nearly 
90% of Saudi Arabia’s export income and 75% of its budge income comes from oil169.  The 
majority of the remaining 10% income comes from oil derivatives such as petro chemicals170.  A 
price downfall due to shale will have severe impacts on Saudi Arabia. 
The price decline will also have a severe impact on other GCC allies that depend on 
Saudi Arabia’s regional leadership.  95% of Kuwait’s export income comes from oil171.  Kuwait 
also has a large Shia population that could open the door for Iranian meddling if there is dissent 
due to the unequal distribution of wealth. The UAE and Qatar are the more economically 
diversified GCC states; even they will feel the ripples of oil price declines172.  For example, 34% 
of Qatar’s income comes from oil173. Of particular concern in the region is Iraq whose entire 
export income makes up more than 99% of its budget174.  This severe budget shortfall is a 
guarantee to keep the country in turmoil and limit the funds it has to deal with ISIL or maintain 
autonomy free of Iran’s influence. 
For Saudi Arabia, optimistic Saudi Arabian leaders have played down the budget shortfall 
threat. They remark that the concerns of Saudi Arabia’s budget shortfall are overblown by the 
media and don’t take into account the countries sovereign wealth overseas investments175.  This 
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is a dangerous mitigation plan because when the price of oil drops, the world economy that is 
correlated to oil prices goes into recession, resulting in the value decline of Saudi Arabia’s 
overseas investments. Second, Saudi Arabia’s assets are estimate at $770 billion, and with the 
current budget deficit rates, the IMF released a report that set shockwaves across the globe by 
stating that Saudi Arabia is currently on track to go bankrupt by 2020176. 
2.5.10 SINKING OIL PRICES AND THE 2016 BUDGET 
Because of oversupply led in particular by Saudi Arabia, which produced at world 
records, the price of oil prices began to sink rapidly in 2015 and continued to slide in 2016. Saudi 
Arabia released a more tightfisted budget for 2016177.  This budget reflects lower spending on 
subsidies because of low oil prices and the involvement in the war in Yemen178. $5.33 billion in 
overspending was due to increased military and security spending179.  The 2015 revenue was 
15% below target, and the government allocated almost $50 billion in provisions for low oil 
prices in 2016180. The government announced unprecedented cuts to energy subsidies, raising 
the prices of water, electricity supplied to households, and the cost of gasoline, ethane and 
gas181.  Although the prices did not increase by a significant amount that will cause 
destabilization, this is just the beginning of the trend in the breaking of the rentierism contract 
that I predicted if the price of oil remains low due to the threat of shale oil.  
2.5.11 IMPLICATIONS 
At the height of the shale oil revolution, some analysts argued that if Saudi Arabia 
vacates the role of swing producer, U.S. shale is primed to step in to take its place to fulfill the 
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role182.  This is a not valid argument.  Comparing the shale industries characteristics against the 
swing production definition in Chapter 1 of this thesis shows that shale exhibits some of the 
swing production qualities.  For example, shale has low upfront capital costs, a short time to 
spin up production, and the ability to turn on and off production depending on market 
demand183. 
Recent evidence showed that as oil prices started to fall in mid-2014, the U.S. shale 
industry went under strain, which resulted in a wave of shale company bankruptcies184.  
Although U.S. shale proved itself as an energy market disrupter that threatened Saudi Arabia’s 
geo-economic position, the U.S. shale industry doesn’t have the ability to come close to 
replacing Saudi Arabia’s supplies or role as swing producer. One of the requirements to meet 
the swing production definition is the ability to keep spare capacity to mitigate oil supply 
disruptions.  For the entire U.S. shale industry, the drilled but uncompleted well backlog, the 
U.S. equivalent of Saudi Arabia’s spare capacity, is quickly diminishing185. In addition, the 
uncoordinated collective production decisions of hundreds of individual private shale firms is no 
match to the centralized strategic thinking of Saudi Arabia’s Oil Ministry policy. 
There is no doubt the U.S. shale industry added fierce competition to the oil market and 
forced Saudi Arabia’s hand, but in response Saudi Arabia protected market share by continuing 
to pump despite an adequately supplied global market which lowered prices and in turn forced 
U.S. shale to show its hand.  In conclusion, U.S. unconventional oil is not a newfound geopolitical 
tool that acts as a substitute with the power gains received from the alliance with Saudi Arabia. 
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Saudi Arabia played a clever geo-economic strategy to force the shale industry to reveal its price 
elasticity and decision-making patterns while ensuring stable revenue for itself to maintain short 
to mid-term stability186.  U.S. shale production and the industry as a whole switched from a 
paradigm of growth to one of survival due to declining production trends and a wave of 
bankruptcies187.  
Although Saudi Arabia’s made the strategic decision to expand its oil refining capacity to 
counter U.S. shale oil competition, its lack of long-term planning could mean overall export 
capacity will decline to less than 5 MBD by 2020 due to domestic consumption188.  This 
threatens its spare capacity, a key geo-economic power tool of strategic importance to balance 
the market and control prices.  If spare capacity dwindles, Saudi Arabia’s role as the world’s 
swing producer is undermined and its international political status, driven from its dominance of 
the oil market, becomes weaker. U.S. policymakers need to ensure that whatever decision they 
decide to make regarding the ban on oil exports that a price war doesn’t start with Saudi Arabia. 
The appropriate market structure that would ensure a stable supply of shale oil and gas without 
exerting a negative impact on renewable energy policies is still missing in the U.S. policy189. 
2.5.12 POTENTIAL BACKLASH TO U.S. SHALE OIL 
Saudi Arabian policymakers have shrugged off the shale revolutions in public, but have 
no doubt that anything that threatens their oil interests is taken seriously and met with the full 
force of the regime. An initial boost of oil supply from the U.S. into the global oil market could 
possibly lead to a competition scenario.  For the U.S., a price war has some serious risk. Break-
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even prices for shale oil are in the range of $44–$68 per barrel, and the extraction of shale oil is 
commercially viable only so long as the oil price remains above $70 per barrel190. A significant 
threat to shale oil production is a prolonged slump of the world economy or a surge in oil 
extraction elsewhere, something Saudi Arabia is solely capable of as a swing producer.  
2.6 CONCLUSION 
U.S. unconventional excess supply weakens already flailing situation, which threatens 
the reduction of spare capacity, which is a key element of swing producer, which weakens its 
status in world geopolitical affairs. Today’s rapidly changing global oil market presents 
fundamental challenges to Saudi Arabia’s ability to use its resource endowment and status as a 
swing producer to project global market power. Saudi Arabia's response to the Arab Spring was 
relentlessly hostile. The kingdom has mobilized both its tremendous wealth and its use of brutal 
force to crush peaceful democratic uprisings at home and around the region. Its approach to 
counterrevolution was carefully orchestrated and enabled with the help of its oil revenue. The 
oil price downturn, already causing significant budget setbacks, will have a significant impact on 
Saudi Arabia’s ability to orchestrate a similar counter-revolutionary reaction in the future. If an 
Arab Spring like event occurred post oil price collapse in 2015 because of the oil surplus created 
by the unconventional shale oil revolution, Saudi Arabia’s stability will be under serious threat. 
The lifting of the oil export ban combined with unconventional oil will allow the U.S. to 
become a major oil exporter in the future.  The consequence could cause massive damage to 
the Saudi government’s revenue and deficit.  As a result, this will have far-reaching effects on 
Saudi Arabia’s rentier state model and ability to crush revolutions at home and abroad, resulting 
in the destabilization of the monarchy.  U.S. policymakers should understand the serious global 
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security risk if Saudi Arabia destabilizes given its strategic role in the Middle East and the energy 
markets.  Even with U.S. intervention, it may be too late for Saudi Arabia to recover from its 
repression, mismanagement of its water, energy resources, wealth, and environment, and 
corruption and waste. The final straw that broke the camel’s back could be the revolution in 
unconventional energy. 
Instability in Saudi Arabia due to environmental and energy security-related threats 
would cause havoc in global oil markets and hurt the U.S. economic and energy security, and will 
eventually weaken the U.S. influence in the region.  This research shows such a revolution can 
not only be sparked by internal dissent or external enemies, but also caused by a paradigm 
shifts in the energy markets. 
Oil revenue, the life source of the Saudi regime’s power, is potentially under threat due 
to the increased supply from unconventional oil. The shale oil revolution if adopted by other 
nations will result in a growing worldwide oil supply surplus, causing a significant dip in oil 
prices, and creating fierce competition among producers, meaning decreased Saudi market 
share.  Saudi Arabia will not remain immune from revolution forever under today’s fragile 
conditions.  Before shale oil, the Saudi regime’s rule had a horizon of at least 75 years-when the 






CHAPTER 3: How Does Potential U.S. Energy Independence Change the 
Balance of Power in the Middle East? 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In a highly interconnected world, disruptive changes in energy markets have the 
potential to produce geopolitical ripples globally.  This research aims to explore this subject by 
posing the research question: How does potential U.S. energy independence change the balance 
of power in the Middle East? My hypothesis is that energy independence combined with the 
Iran nuclear deal will change the U.S. relationship with its Gulf allies, which will cause various 
shifts in geopolitical alliances and the region’s balance of power. Ultimately, the most influential 
factor in determining the U.S. strategic interest and footprint in the Middle East is tied to 
economic security dependence rather than the physical supply of oil. 
This paper contributes to the field of study by providing a greater understanding of the 
linkage between the global oil market and the Middle East region’s security dynamics, which will 
inform U.S. policymakers to protect and advance U.S. interests by ensuring a stable and 
desirable balance of power in the region. This research also contributes to the existing body of 
literature by providing a comprehensive assessment of the complex geopolitical 
interdependencies between U.S. security interests in the Middle East with respect to other 
global and regional powers. 
3.2 BACKGROUND 
Dependence on foreign oil and the end of imperialism are the main reasons the United 
States (U.S.) abandoned its policy of isolationism in the Middle East following World War II.  The 
U.S. did not embark on an imperial colonization spree like other western powers, but rather 
pursued a mutually beneficial relationship with oil producing countries in the Middle East.  The 
ensuing Cold War was a zero-sum game against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) 
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and the pursuit of hegemony to control the Middle East energy resources was a key part of U.S. 
national security. 
After the September 11th attacks, over a decade’s worth of war on two fronts 
(Afghanistan and Iraq) left the U.S. with a massive number of human and monetary losses, 
meanwhile leaving the Middle East in its most turbulent state in modern times.  Ever since, the 
U.S. and the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape has shifted significantly. U.S. dependence on 
foreign oil declined since peaking in 2005191.  U.S. shale oil production skyrocketed and, 
combined with massive improvements in automotive fuel efficiency technology, the nation’s 
foreign oil dependence transformed dramatically. 
Meanwhile domestically the U.S. economy remained volatile and Americans felt the 
squeeze of the global economic recession. The U.S. national debt continued to rise and 
infrastructure continued to crumble.  Concurrently, the Middle East spiraled towards anarchy 
despite U.S. efforts to transform the region, resulting in increased anti-Americanism. With all 
the domestic issues and growing Middle Eastern conflicts, some have argued that as the U.S. 
now has the ability to be energy independent and free of foreign imports from unstable regions, 
it should pull back from the Middle East. 
Similar to how the invasion of Iraq had unintended geopolitical consequences, scaling 
back U.S. hegemony in the Middle East does too.  This is not easy to predict in a region full of 
many complex geopolitical relationships.  At stake is the U.S. strategic relationship with regional 
allies with which strong security ties help the U.S. deal with broader regional forces of 
instability.  The list of regional threats includes a wide variety of issues ranging from Iran’s 
                                                          




regional hegemonic ambitions, the threat of global terrorism, and regime stability concerns in all 
countries of the region.  
The U.S. is the main guarantor of stability and security in the Gulf region due to the 
importance of its geographic location, energy, and financial wealth to national security and 
geopolitical interests. To implement this security umbrella, the U.S. and Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries established security cooperation agreements.  This security framework 
protects the GCC from external rivals such as Iran.  Iran’s aspirations to extend its reginal 
influence emanates from its ideology, which not only contradicts U.S. values and interests, but 
also aims to undermine it in the region and beyond192. Any potential Iranian act that seeks to 
dominate in the region is a threat to U.S. interests.  
3.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The focus of the compiled literature centers around the intermingled topics of U.S. 
hegemony in the Middle East, the impact of recent U.S. policy shifts on the relationship with the 
region’s political powers, and the implications of Iran’s nuclear agreement on the region’s 
balance of power. U.S. national security literature is the overarching framework to organize the 
researched subtopics. The balance of power theory is the main international relations 
theoretical approach to analyze the Middle East’s security in this research.  Understanding the 
interests and motivations of the various global powers competing for Middle Eastern energy 
resources is an important analysis in this research. 
El-Katiri (2013) argues that a balance between different power centers amongst GCC 
states and the wider region best preserves U.S. interests193. A monopoly of excessive power by 
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any single country would be a recipe for destabilization and conflict.  El-Katiri recommends the 
U.S. should aim to prevent the control of the region’s energy resources under the influence of 
any single dominant power194.  Since the rise of a sole regional power risks the region’s stability, 
it consequently also threatens U.S. national security interests. 
Realism observes that international politics or the behavior of states towards each other 
is because of the constant struggle for power195.  In order to contain power and limit its 
potential abuse, the balance of power theory becomes central to the realist perspective on 
international relations196. A balance of power in equilibrium refers to conditions where the 
power of one state or set of states is balanced by equivalent power of another state or set of 
states197.  A balance of power is in disequilibrium when distribution among contending states is 
not balanced198.  This condition favors the leading hegemon and may result in abuse of power by 
the strongest state, leading to instability.  The theory acknowledges that unbalanced power in 
the system is unsafe. 
According to theory, there are four ways to change the balance of power status quo or 
preserve it199.  The first is to make a hostile state weak by dividing it or keeping it divided.  A 
second way is to maintain or re-establish balance through territorial compensation. The third 
way is through either initiating an arms race or disarmament. Lastly, by establishing alliances 
which are historically proven the most important manifestation of the balance of power200.  
Alliances can aim to either change, maintain or re-establish the balance of power.  Now that the 
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U.S. has achieved a greater degree of energy independence due to the shale oil revolution, this 
liberation alters the U.S. balance of power with traditional regional allies it relied on previously 
for energy security.  Therefore, it is a legitimate case for the U.S. to re-examine its relationships 
and overall involvement in the region, especially since it comes at a hefty price.  
There are two opposing views regarding the strategic posture for the U.S. in the Middle 
East: to either remain involved or whether to scale back. U.S. policy in the Middle East 
historically is dominated by hard military power for previous decades.  The negative 
consequences of U.S. involvement cost hundreds of thousands lives and millions displaced 
people201, generated anti-American resentment, helped keep oppressive dictatorships in power, 
and fueled sectarian and religious extremism. The rapid growth in domestic oil supplies and 
declining import dependence created the perception occasionally supported by U.S. policies, 
actions, or lack thereof that the U.S. is ready to disengage from the Middle East. The Middle East 
Policy Council interviewed many influential players on Capitol Hill and found that the 
overwhelming majority are against even limited military action in the region202.   
Some scholars argue that the benefits of oil independence allow the U.S. to project 
power to exert influence without having to rely so heavily on hard power. Howard (2008) argues 
that oil independence has significant geopolitical security benefits for the U.S. in restraining 
destructive actions of oil exporters203.  An example to support this argument is the case of U.S. 
economic sanctions against Libya, which prevented them from increasing oil production, 
eventually resulting in forcing former Prime Minister Muammar al-Gaddafi to give up his pursuit 
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of nuclear weapons from Pakistan204.  Howard only provides one case study as evidence, which 
is an oversimplified analysis to draw the conclusion that U.S. unconventional oil as a newfound 
political tool. 
Other scholars make similar broad arguments. Bahgat and Sharp (2014) analyzed a new 
U.S. strategic orientation in context to post-Arab spring developments and post-energy 
independence205.  They makes the argument that moving forward,  the U.S. should play a less 
active role in the Arab world and give major regional states the time and space needed to sort 
out their domestic and foreign policies206.  While the U.S. should not cut them off completely, it 
needs to focus on the strongest ties it has already with Israel and Turkey, and address the major 
issues it has with Iran207.   
Arguing for a tradeoff at the expense of Arab allies is a risky proposition.  The authors 
reason the U.S. has major policy differences with the two other major Arab countries, Syria and 
Iraq, because they have had a strong alliance with the U.S.S.R. in the past, and now Russia.  Not 
only is this a weak reason to make the argument, but it also ignores the strong relationship 
Russia has with Iran.  I agree with part of their conclusion, that less foreign intervention by the 
U.S. is likely to help Arab countries to determine their future without blaming foreign countries, 
but the U.S. should focus on the entire region, not just the three peripheries: Iran, Israel, and 
Turkey208. 
Another group of scholars argues energy independence will not decrease U.S. 
involvement in the Middle East because U.S. interests in the region, including the protection of 
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worldwide energy security, will remain a U.S. priority209.  Another reason given is that terrorism 
will not decline in the region if the U.S. ceases to buy oil because terrorism is not funded by 
oil210.  The other argument supporting this view is regardless if the U.S. energy independent or 
not, other large consumers of oil such as China will fuel geopolitical challenges211. Luft (2014) 
argues U.S. independence from Middle Eastern oil is not a factor in the decision to reduce 
military and diplomatic involvement in the region212.  Only 9% of U.S. demand is met by imports 
from the Middle East213.  In fact, historically, U.S. imports from the region never exceeded 14% 
of U.S. demand214. Luft argues that the price, not the origination of oil is what is vital to U.S. 
interests. 
Then there is a more extreme neoconservative view that argues the U.S. does not simply 
need to obtain oil, they want to eliminate all potential competitors and safeguard the region 
politically and militarily to benefit from the global flow of Middle Eastern oil (Gokay 2015)215. 
The evidence from this view is critical in reference to the empirics section to understand the 
consequences of losing or maintaining certain regional alliances. Gokay (2015) notes the U.S. 
benefits from Middle East hegemony because it allows the U.S. dollar to act as a global reserve 
currency and dominate the finance of international economic transactions, including global 
trade and debt payments216.  Dollar strength is key to U.S. economic global power it impacts the 
economy, the dollar’s status as a reserve currency is beneficial to dealing with trade deficits and 
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keeping domestic interest rates low. The dollar’s global standing is not simply about economics, 
but rather deeply rooted in the geopolitical role of the U.S.  
A “petrodollar” is a dollar earned by a country through the sale of oil217.  In 1972-1974, 
the U.S. and Saudi Arabia negotiated an agreement to link the sale of oil to the dollar218.  Under 
the U.S.-Saudi Joint Economic Commission, the U.S. agreed to provide technical support and 
military assistance in exchange for Saudi Arabia accepting only U.S. dollars for its oil.  Since oil is 
the most important commodity critical to the basic function of all modern economies, countries 
buy and hold large reserves of dollars because they would not be able to purchase oil without 
dollars219.  This system keeps the global demand for the dollar artificially high, benefiting U.S. 
security and economy by subsidizing increases in U.S. government military spending and 
American consumer imports220. 
Additionally, with OPEC oil priced in U.S. dollars, the U.S. government benefits from a 
double loan221.  The first portion is the U.S. can print dollars at almost no cost to buy oil  and the 
U.S. economy does not have to generate goods and services since OPEC uses dollars for all 
traded goods and services222. The second and more important loan comes from fueling U.S. 
Treasury purchase223.  Despite their extensive oil wealth, Middle Eastern countries failed to 
develop diversified economies making them reliant on Western imports for goods and services.  
The Nixon Administration (1969-1974) secretly coaxed Saudi Arabia to purchase U.S. treasury 
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bills and bonds224, subsidizing the U.S. economy drastically reducing the currency risk exposure 
of the U.S. economy. 
This system also contributes to the weapon sales for petrodollar circulation225.  The 
Middle East became the world’s largest weapons importer since the early 1970s226.  The U.S. 
gets dual benefit from the use of the dollar for oil going out and weapons for dollars coming in. 
This “petrodollar” system is fundamental and crucial for U.S. hegemony. The research 
conducted by Gokay provides an unpublicized yet very strong argument for why U.S. energy 
independence from oil imports should not be the driving factor in determining U.S. posture in 
the Middle East.  The petrodollar system benefits U.S. national security immensely and provides 
good reason for the U.S. to keeps Middle Eastern oil ample, inexpensive, and under U.S. 
influence. 
There are many challenges to U.S. hegemony in the region.  As the hegemon in the 
region, the U.S. is part of the internal and external security construct of the Gulf227.  The current 
tensions are high between the region’s dominant bi-polar powers, the GCC (mainly Saudi Arabia) 
on one side, and Iran on the other. Arab gulf countries have several concerns about Iran.  They 
suspect that Iran is directly supporting Shia minorities, an act considered as direct interference 
in their internal security.  Iran sees U.S. hegemony and influence in the Middle East as a threat 
and continuously criticizes the strong U.S. ties with Arab governments228.  Iran has always been 
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anxious about the U.S. presence in the region and sees forward deployed forces in American 
bases as an act a deterrence against Iranian power229.  
The Arab concerns over Iran are not unfounded. In 2011, Iran released a study 
recommending that the country should play a major role in world affairs as the defender of all 
Muslims, to guard its national interest’s, and become the beacon for exporting its revolutionary 
Islam throughout the world230.  The study concludes that Iran is optimally situated 
geographically to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf231. There are various 
territorial disputes between Iran and several GCC states232.  El-Katiri (2013) thinks that a U.S. pull 
back could signal to Iran the green light to push for claiming disputed territories more 
aggressively, risking a conflict with the GCC and destabilizing the region further233.  El-Katiri 
states there is a deep and broad underlying animosity between the GCC and Iran fueled by Iran’s 
desire to become a regional power234.  This perceived threat is also shared amongst non-Arab 
regional neighbors Israel and Turkey. 
The mistrust and rivalry with Iran deepened following the U.S.-led war in Iraq (2003) 
because it profoundly changed the regional balance of power.  Iran emerged as a dominant 
force in the region, threatening GCC countries by extending its influence on Shias across the 
region.  This resulted in a regional power competition for influence between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, with both countries engaging in proxy conflicts in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. 
To counter Iran’s regional influence, Saudi Arabia invested billions of petro-dollars in support of 
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its foreign policy goals235.  This includes supporting counter-revolutionary regimes during the 
Arab uprisings as well as waging a regional proxy war against Iran236. 
The conflict for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia has serious 
implications on the region’s balance of power.   Both countries sought to increase their power 
and security by allying with others inside and outside the region237.  Alghunaim (2014) observes 
that both Iran and Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy follow the perspective of neorealism238.  To 
strengthen its security and to broaden regional power, Iran allied with Russia, and other states 
followed such as Syria followed suit239. Similarly, Saudi Arabia historically allied with the U.S. and 
other regional states followed (e.g. UAE and Qatar).   
However, the geopolitical developments since September 11th, the Iraq war (2003), and 
the Arab Spring (early 2011) caused major challenges to U.S.-Middle East policy. The last few 
years have brought the U.S. at a crossroads with its traditional Middle Eastern allies, specifically 
Saudi Arabia. The Iraq war in 2003 had the unintended consequence of tilting the balance of 
power of the Middle East towards Iran.  The recent signing of the nuclear agreement will change 
that balance even further.  Higher production from Iran and Iraq will lead to conflict within 
OPEC.  Persistent budget deficits for OPEC members will lead to spending cuts and end up in 
unrest. 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE had disagreements with the U.S. over its reaction to the Arab 
Spring and were concerned about the U.S. decision to dump Egypt’s President Hosni 
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Mubarak240.  There was also concern over the eager engagement with the Muslim 
Brotherhood241.  The Gulf perceives these events as a dramatic change in a long-standing U.S. 
policy.  This makes them doubt the U.S. as a reliable ally, which will force them to seek alliances 
elsewhere to balance regional power. 
The Arab Spring was just the start of U.S. and GCC regional security framework and 
policy disagreements. The Iran nuclear deal was even more troubling than the U.S. response to 
the Arab Spring, leaving Saudi Arabia further questioning the depth of U.S. commitment to their 
security. Ulrichsen (2009) argues the perceived ideological threat from Iran is under control by 
the GCCs bilateral integration under the U.S. security umbrella242.  If this umbrella goes away, 
Iran may destabilize the region by holding true to threats it has made in the past.   The legacy of 
Iranian ambition to attain regional hegemony alongside the presence of a substantial Shia 
population in GCC countries increases the likelihood of bipolar conflict. 
Kinninmont (2015) hypothesizes that the nuclear agreement has intensified the political 
tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia243. The Saudi military intervention in Yemen to counter 
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels supports her claim.  On the other hand, Kinninmont argues that 
better relations between the U.S. and Iran could neutralize one of the biggest challengers to U.S. 
hegemony in the region and maintain a balance of power. 
 Saudi Arabia’s anxieties is a result of the perception that the U.S. is disengaging from the 
Middle East244.  Despite repeated U.S. assurances and leadership visits, questions have surfaced 
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in Saudi Arabia about the U.S. commitment to the region245.  There is suspicion that the U.S. is 
softening its stance on Iran, which makes Saudi rulers nervous.  Their biggest fear is the U.S. may 
be seeking to build a new relationship with Iran at the expense of Saudi Arabia246. 
Scholars from the Middle East Policy Council went to Capitol Hill to research the Gulf 
States’ anxieties relating to U.S. policies in the Middle East, specifically with respect to Iran247.  
They concluded from interviewing policymakers dealing with the region that the U.S. is 
commitment exhausted248.  The council found the major difference between the U.S. and the 
GCC is over Iran because the U.S. is perceived as only focused on Iran’s nuclear armament and 
not their regional ambitions that will be carried through destabilizing activities249.  The Council 
thinks the Obama administration is pivoting focus to deal with the security threats emanating 
from Asia and Russia. The U.S. might reallocate some of its forces to Asia or Europe, leaving 
Iran’s destabilizing activities unchallenged. 
O’Sullivan (2015) argues Iran’s return to the international oil market will increase its 
power and lead to new forms of geopolitical competition, which will lead to further tension and 
conflict250. The GCC would prefer the U.S. to continue policing the Gulf while Iran seeks a 
regional security architecture251.  This is unacceptable to GCC states because Iran would 
dominate this architecture due to its massive geographic and population size compared to the 
majority of the Gulf States. 
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The GCC faces heightened internal and external threats aside from the current tensions 
with Iran. With ISIL in Syria and Iraq, AQAP in Yemen and the Iranian influence all around them, 
Saudi Arabia is surrounded by a variety of dangerous nemeses. There are also many internal 
stability issues due to the GCC’s population demographic trends and structural imbalances, 
which have serious long-term challenges252. Rapid population growth and inadequate 
employment opportunities are a major threat to long-term stability in the GCC253. The increased 
polarity of economic wealth and political resources distributed unevenly have the potential to 
strike at the heart of the rentier state model.   
Bremmer (2016) views the Middle East as the most vulnerable to a geopolitical power 
vacuum and a top global security risk254.  Saudi Arabia faces growing uncertainty due to the royal 
family internal power struggle.  Bremmer thinks this will lead Saudi rulers to act more 
aggressively and heighten instability in the region.  The military operation in Yemen is evidence 
to support Bremmer’s prediction255. The royal family’s internal strife, which threatens Saudi 
Arabia’s stability, is due to a succession problem.  All the founding King’s sons are deceased and 
the remaining pool of candidates likely to be King will skip to the next generation for the first 
time in the Kingdom’s history. 
The GCC cannot handle serious regional security issues alone; a prime example is the 
current status of the failed Yemeni state.  The Saudi Arabian military failed to produce any 
strategic results though its use of military intervention, and there is a lack of political or 
economic engagement to tackle the root cause of the Yemini state failure and all its societal 
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strains256.  Even though the failing Yemeni state is a direct threat to the security and stability of 
the region, the GCC is not able to reach a consensus or invest the non-military resources to 
tackle the instability257. 
 Complicating the issue is King Salman’s empowerment of his 30-year old son 
Mohammed bin Salman which has fueled frustration among the royal family258.  While the 
struggle is unlikely to lead to a near-term power collapse, it contributes to the overall regional 
instability risk, especially dangerous when combined with the host of other threats discussed 
throughout this research. The GCC countries needs to leverage the power of external allies to 
guarantee their security. Since Saudi Arabia and the U.S. diverged fundamentally on Iran, they 
are contemplating the reliability of their traditional alliance with the U.S. and will consider 
pivoting to other alliances.   
3.4 METHODOLOGY 
The balance of power theory is used to examine what Saudi Arabia and Iran are doing to 
strengthen their regional hegemony. Armament and alliances are the most prevalent policies 
these States use to pursue balance of power, so the empiric evidence will focus on these use 
cases. Alliances are more likely to occur with States dependent on Middle Eastern energy 
resources, involved in selling weapons to the region, or have other ideological similarities. I 
investigate use cases that highlight how the U.S. can promote stability using the balance of 
power theory in regional power competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran following the recent 
political developments (described previously).  This includes understanding the viewpoints of 
various actors at the implications of the U.S. pivoting towards Iran after signing the nuclear deal 
                                                          





and furthering away from Saudi Arabia following the various regional security policy 
disagreements. 
The current and potential future alliances that Saudi Arabia and Iran are establishing 
with outside powers will also be analyzed.  It’s important to understand the interests, 
motivations, and dynamics of the main actors with respect to geopolitical issues, energy 
demands, and balance of power.  The countries evaluated include China, Russia, the U.S., GCC 
States (mainly Saudi Arabia), Turkey, and Iran.  The use cases evaluated are from post-Arab 
Spring (2011) literature and beyond, and includes current events impacting the relevant actors 
and the region’s balance of power. The three scenarios the U.S. could pursue are to remain 
allied with the GCC, make a pivot towards Iran, or disengage completely from the region. How 
competitors will react to the change in U.S. policy decisions is evaluated. The implications of 
these reactions to U.S. hegemony in the region is also discussed. 
3.5 EMPIRICS 
3.5.1 WEAKENING CURRENT ALLIANCES 
Saudi Arabia is more geographically isolated today with regard to its regional allies259.  
Egypt and Pakistan dodged requests to support the Saudi military intervention in Yemen260.  The 
past conforming and smaller GCC countries are hedging their position by maintaining good 
relations with Saudi Arabia’s rival, Iran.  Saudi Arabia cannot depend on the alliance with OPEC 
because the organization is a debacle with the low oil prices.  The alliance with Egypt is 
complicated because the country backed Russia’s pro-Assad intervention in Syria261, directly 
opposing Saudi Arabia’s political stance on the conflict. 
                                                          





Weakening Saudi Arabia’s position is the fact that some GCC allies maintain a good 
economic relationship with Iran despite unresolved territorial disputes (e.g. UAE and Qatar)262. 
The ascension of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring strained relations between 
Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Countries263.  In Tunisia and Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise 
revived worries in Saudi Arabia about a competing Sunni-Muslim government model.  Qatar and 
Turkey on the other hand supported the Muslim Brotherhood and backed Syrian opposition 
groups that fought Saudi-backed Islamist groups264. 
The events surrounding the Arab Spring strained relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar.  The U.S. has a heavy military presence in Qatar and therefore has some leverage and a 
strong relationship.  Disengaging from the Middle East and leaving smaller states like Qatar to 
pursue a competitive and opposing policy increases the likelihood of conflict.  Turkey is a major 
Muslim Brotherhood supporter, an enemy of Saudi Arabia, and the country competes with Saudi 
Arabia for regional power and leadership of the Sunni world.  
 Saudi Arabia lost one of its closest allies during the Arab Spring when Egypt’s President 
Mubarak was overthrown.  Nazer (2015) argues that currently Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s relations 
are strained due to several significant policy differences265.  Despite their differences, Egypt 
receives substantial financial support from Saudi Arabia; moreover the two countries share a 
common interest in potentially developing of an independent joint military to fill in the U.S. 
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power vacuum266. This force would intervene in regional crises and respond to non-state actors 
such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).   
This development is dangerous to U.S. interests for several reasons.  The first is the 
approach will likely combine Saudi Arabian money and high-tech weapons and military 
equipment acquired from the U.S. with Egyptian manpower and experience; as some have 
argued, this is a poor substitute for U.S. military presence. The second reason is Egypt is starting 
to reestablish its military relationship with Russia since the U.S. decided to freeze military 
support. In 2014, Egypt and Russia signed a protocol to expand bilateral military ties and shortly 
after reached a preliminary deal to purchase $3.5 billion of arms from Russia267. 
3.5.2 U.S. DISENGAGEMENT 
Saudi Arabia was disappointed in the U.S. decision to reduce military assistance to Egypt 
and vowed to make up for it.  The alternative is Egyptian weapons purchases come from Russia.  
Russia exploited the opportunity by sending a military delegation to Cairo to discuss sales of MI-
35 helicopters and MIG-35 fighter aircraft268.  The trip marked the first return of Russian-
Egyptian relations since 1972 when President Sadat expelled Soviet advisors269. 
The rapid progression and expansion of economic and political ties with China, India, 
and Russia is creating new strategic linkages that are shifting the international relations of the 
region subtly away from the U.S.  Russia is the world’s second largest non-OPEC oil and gas 
producer.  Its interest in the region revolves around competing for primary consumers, mainly 
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Europe270.  There is a risk that Russia may act deviously to destabilize the region to ensure its 
supply lines to Europe maximize its influence on the continent and the U.S.’s Western allies.  
Russia uses energy as a foreign policy tool, in order to maximize its power, security, and 
geopolitical advantages271.  
The threat to U.S. hegemony if the U.S. pulls back from the region is that Saudi Arabia 
and Russia could establish an alliance based on weapons sales, energy coordination, and 
regional conflict resolution.  Russia can use its regional influence to support Saudi Arabia’s 
interests in Syria by removing Assad from power in exchange for weapons deals, higher oil prices 
to support each countries budget deficits, and colluding on oil supplies to the West.  A Saudi 
Arabian-Russian alliance would combine two of the largest oil suppliers, which would make it 
possible to collude on demanding higher prices for oil to support Russian state needs. 
With more unchecked power in the region, Russia may pursue a destabilizing foreign 
policy due to low oil prices. Russia is a threat to the U.S.-European alliance, a key U.S. hegemony 
partnership, referred to as “the world’s most durable and significant alliance, underpinning the 
global economic order and bolstering peace and stability for nearly seventy years.” 272 European 
dependence on Russian energy has weakened this alliance with respect to dealing with Russia 
and Iran’s regional power. 
3.5.3 U.S. PIVOT TO IRAN 
On the other hand, a U.S. pivot to Iran not only balances the power between regional 
countries (Saudi Arabia and Iran), but also keep external forces out (e.g. China, Russia).  The 
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nuclear agreement means a possible partnership between Iran, Turkey, and the West to 
transport energy to Europe through Syria and Turkey273.  The Iran deal deprives Russia of one of 
its most important bargaining positions.  The deal has the potential to strengthen U.S. global 
hegemony against Russia’s expansionist policies by depriving the country of hard currency to 
check its power and force a change in their behavior. 
As the Gulf’s share of energy production increases, the most significant increase is going 
to Asia274.  This will increase the strategic importance of the region to Asian countries who will 
want a stake in regional affairs.  If the past is any indication of predicting future actions, then the 
U.S. has a legitimate security threat.  China and India have already reacted with muscular 
deployment of naval forces to protect their own maritime security interests in the region275. 
India is even more energy dependent on the Middle East region because, unlike China, which 
can easily get energy imports from Russia due to geographic proximity, the region is India’s only 
close source of oil and gas276.  India’s oil dependence will turn the balance of power in the region 
into a multipolar system in which other powers compete against U.S. reginal hegemony for 
influence. India views the Gulf as an intrinsic part of its broader neighborhood277.  India signed 
defense cooperation agreements with both Qatar and Oman on maritime security, data sharing, 
and to work through common threats278. 
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China is a major buyer of Middle Eastern oil, doubling its import from 2007 to 2012 to 
3.1 MBD279.  The implication is China is important to the region as an alternate consumer to 
Western markets, which can use the power of consumption or alternative energy to hurt the 
Middle Eastern suppliers. The U.S. and Europe are likely to cut back imports from the Middle 
East region meanwhile rapid growth from China and other Asian importers could mean a 
balance of power shift to Asia. Europe imports as a whole declined, importing 3.8 million barrels 
per day (MBD) in 2012, a quarter less than what it had in 2007280. China is the largest oil 
importer in the world and its demand for oil will continue to grow at a dramatic pace to support 
its main concern of maintaining economic growth281.  China has an aggressive record of 
establishing alliances to secure oil supplies through contracts, investments, and favorable loans.  
Its projected energy demand will intensify and so will its assertion to project global power on 
regions that impact its economy. 
Meanwhile China constructed a naval base at the Pakistani port of Gwadar, close 
enough to the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz282, but not too close to the GCC to raise U.S. 
suspicion. Although China pursued a no strings attached policy with sub-Saharan countries in 
exchange for oil exports, these countries began shifting away from the West towards China 
geopolitically283.  These gravitational pulls are expected since deep economic ties shift influence 
towards partners with mutual interests.  This same scenario will play out between China and the 
Middle Eastern countries if the U.S. pulls back.  China is becoming increasingly susceptible to oil 
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disruptions; they will do everything in their power to fight for regional power. China is Iran’s 
largest oil and gas importer and established energy deals valued at $100 billion.  The bond 
formed by this alliance almost guarantees China will use its veto power in the UN Security 
Council to protect Iran against future U.S. sanctions. As China’s oil demand grows, so will its 
involvement in Middle Eastern politics284.  China is likely to provide the region’s exporters 
diplomatic support and weapons sales. 
Increased economic and security inter-dependence  is generating cooperation between 
the Middle East and East Asia and the rise of China in the region is likely to lead to confrontation 
with the U.S.285.  Saudi Arabia’s King Salman’s visit (2014) to China focused on economic 
cooperation286.  There is a military relationship possibility as well because Saudi Arabia 
purchased East Wind ballistic missiles in the 1980s287. 
Although China is a main adversary fighting for influence over the Middle East, it shares 
common regional interests with the U.S. with respect to energy, and there is a chance for 
coordination on a variety of efforts including shale oil development, supply disruptions, 
response initiatives, and maritime security.  I argue a strategic reason the U.S. should factor is 
not to allow China easy access to Middle Eastern oil so that the U.S. can sell oil to them to 
strengthen or power balance with China.  The U.S. can increase energy exports to Asia and 
compete with Middle Eastern countries for that market share.  This will strengthen the U.S. 
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dollar and improve the trade balance with China. U.S. hegemony means having some influence 
over where the region’s oil is old, preferably not to global markets strategic to the U.S. 
The destination of Middle Eastern oil exports will continue to pivot eastward to non-
OECD Asian countries as Western demand declines288.  China and India are the primary drivers of 
demand.  China will seek to convert its growing economic relationship into political influence289.  
Realism and balance of power theory suggests it will. Domestic oil abundance allows the U.S. to 
pursue policy changes in two key global oil epicenters: China and the Middle East.  The two 
epicenters are not mutually exclusive because China is dependent on Middle Eastern energy. 
3.5.4 IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. POWER VACUUM 
Issues of energy dependence and security of access to regional resources give other 
external powers a stake in regional security.  If the U.S. leaves a power vacuum, other global 
powers thirsty for energy supplies will rush in to fill the void. A U.S. power vacuum can also open 
the door for external rivals to meddle in the region’s affairs and harm U.S. interests.  Russia’s 
recent actions in Syria are aimed at ensuring instability in the region290.  Its intervention helps 
prevent the creation of a trans-Syrian energy pipeline to hinder Saudi Arabian attempts to 
increase their share of the European energy markets291.  Leonard (2016) argues Russia will 
undertake further actions to increase the probability of a major war in the Middle East292.  
Russia could also increase its military presence and scope of operations, arm rival states to try to 
cause turmoil, all with the aim of causing a significant rise in oil prices and protecting market 
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share by cutting off Middle Eastern supply lines to Europe293. Radical extremism and 
transnational terrorism could also flourish after a U.S. power vacuum294.  Over the past year, the 
rise of ISIS materialized into a real threat to the internal security and external stability of the 
region. 
3.5.5 IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. PIVOT TO IRAN 
A U.S. pivot to Iran also has pros and cons. The peacefully negotiated resolution with 
Iran over the nuclear program will lead to a removal of sanctions against Iran’s economy and oil 
industry.  Iran will immediately seek to return exports to previous levels.  Iran’s oil minister 
recently announced that the country is targeting an output level of 4.2 MBD295.  The market is 
already oversupplied due to the Saudi-driven battle for market share. Iran’s supply will add to 
the global excess supply and put more downward pressure on prices, exacerbating the regional 
risks associated with government deficits. Persistent budget deficits will lead to discontent and 
political unrest and could lead to regional competitors acting more aggressive to secure other 
sources of power as the economic and political power provided by oil revenue declines. 
Saudi Arabia is drifting away from the U.S. because of serious political differences it has 
over Syria and Iran. The Iranian threat combined with U.S. decisions on Syria and nuclear 
negotiations with Iran is already showing evidence of threatening the balance of power in the 
region296.  The GCC is already starting to take regional security matters in their own hand, 
including dominating recent post-war engagement with Afghanistan297. Additionally, Saudi 
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Arabia undertook strategic steps to consolidate its place as a regional superpower298.  These 
measures are due to the perceived U.S. disengagement and fears of Iran’s ambitions299.  Saudi 
Arabia became the largest importer of weapons, spending around $6.46 in 2014300.  They have 
also taken part in the air-bombardment in the U.S.-led campaign against ISIL301.  However, since 
the nuclear agreement was reached, Saudi Arabia have embarked on their own to launch 
operation (called Decisive Storm) against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. 
  The U.S. tried to use the disarmament method in the balance of power against Iran to 
promote regional stability.  The West’s strategy to halt Iran’s nuclear program by isolating it 
diplomatically strengthened its relations with Russia and other energy producing central-Asian 
countries302.  Iran also utilized its energy resources to purchase diplomatic protection from 
China and India. Iran on the other hand is in better economic shape than the GCC to deal with 
depressed oil prices and use the opportunity to gain more power over a limited Saudi Arabia.  
Iran’s economy is more resilient due to the fact it’s been operating despite oil sanctions against 
its oil-dominated economy.  Once the oil export sanctions are lifted, their oil elastic economy is 
more rigid and will give them an advantage over the GCC and improving its chances to tilt the 
power balance inward. 
Recalling the balance of power theory, Morgenthau’s (1948) argued the danger of using 
the arms race approach to balance power is unstable303. This point is worthy of highlighting 
because it’s been the U.S. approach in the region, specifically supporting Iraq against Iran in 
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their 1980s war, up until now: exporting 33% of worldwide exports (by far the top arms exporter 
on the planet).  The Middle East was the main recipient (40% of total U.S. arms exports), with 
Saudi Arabia being top overall, followed closely by the UAE and Turkey, with Iraq, and Egypt in 
the top 10304. 
The U.S. was pursuing a disarmament strategy with Iran up until the signing of the 
nuclear deal. The policy recommendation is under no condition should the U.S. sell weapons to 
Iran in the future or use the arms race strategy in the balance of power theory to maintain 
equilibrium.   Continuing the pattern of arms sales to the region will make Iran feel threatened 
by the qualitative military edge (QME) of its neighbors. The U.S. policy has to take into its 
commitment to Israel to maintain a qualitative military against its Arab adversaries even though 
it sells them the most weapons305.  Now the QME strategy must take into account Iran’s 
emergence as a regional threat, and incorporate the fact that Iran will pursue arms purchases 
from other suppliers such as Russia or China, complicating the set of actors the U.S. must 
balance against for the region’s control. 
Morgenthau, on the other hand, argues that disarmament could be a form of 
establishing the balance306.  The challenge with this approach for the U.S. and its allies is now 
there are non-State actors in the region that cannot be diplomatically forced to give up their 
weapons.  Even with State actors, Morgenthau and other realists argued that the problem with 
the disarmament approach is that it is difficult to control among competing nations307.  If the 
U.S. disengages with respect to arms sales without having a real strategy to disarm the region 
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and eliminate non-State actor threats, Iran will buy weapons from Russia and Saudi Arabia from 
China308.  These potential suppliers do not have the same QME agreement the U.S. has with 
Israel, possibly adding another complexity into the region’s multi-polar distribution of power. 
A U.S. power vacuum will result in lost alliances and increased likelihood of instability in 
the region. Not all conflicts in the region can be solved using military intervention.  Soft power is 
a key tool used by the U.S. to ensure conflicts are peacefully solved in the region309.  This can be 
direct application of soft power or through an alley of the U.S.310.  Losing Saudi Arabia means 
losing an ally who positioned itself among the primary mediators in the Middle East’s most 
intractable conflicts. U.S. energy production is unlikely to shield the U.S. economy from price 
fluctuations emanating from Middle East and even less likely to weaken U.S. commitment and 
attempts to influence the region.   
There are several reasons for the U.S. to resume hard and soft power commitments to 
the region.  First, Asia’s growing energy dependence would open the door for Chinese, Indian, 
and Russian involvement in the region.  Second, the U.S. weapons and aerospace industry 
exports totaled $100 billion per year; half of these products go to Middle Eastern countries.  The 
importance of aerospace and defense to the U.S. economy means the U.S. is dependent on 
remaining engaged in the region to prevent Chinese, Russian, and Indian weapons manufacturer 
from entering. 
Saudi Arabia will not hesitate to shift to establish alliances with other weapons sellers.  
In the mid-1980s, when the U.S. refused to sell Saudi Arabia sophisticated weapons systems, 
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Saudi Arabia signed a huge arms deal with Britain311. This is evidence that they turn to who helps 
them meet their self-interest, which could mean the U.S. would hurt the income and soft power 
from arms sales. In fact, the nuclear deal caused Saudi Arabia to taken a drastic step towards 
realpolitik by establishing alliances with its sworn enemy: Israel.  It was recently revealed at the 
Council on Foreign Relations in Washington that Saudi Arabia and Israel have been covertly 
conducting diplomacy in a series of meetings since 2014 to discuss Iran’s growing strength as a 
regional power312. 
The importance of the U.S.-Saudi Arabian alliance is also too big of threat to lose. Saudi 
Arabia is a key and reliable ally of the Wet against mutual enemies since the 1950s313.  Its 
strategic importance to economic security is oil, while politically its conservatism made it a 
useful partner against anti-western ideologies such as Pan-Arabism and communism314.  As a 
result, the West have systematically guaranteed its protection and turned a blind eye to its long 
list of human rights abuses315. Pulling out of the region hurts the U.S. ability to influence policy 
of our allies are conflicts of interests. Despite alliances, states are sovereign and autonomous 
self-preserving entities and so diverging interests are bound to arise.  In 2011, the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia adopted opposite stances on regional issues.  In February 2011, Saudi Arabian leaders 
expressed strong dismay of what they saw as U.S. abandonment of President Hosni Mubarak in 
Egypt316. 
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Saudi Arabia will actively looking for alternative alliance, not to abandon the U.S. 
completely, but they have the urgent need to reinforce the U.S. security umbrella by developing 
other relations317. Back when Saudi Arabia’s Prince Salman was the crown prince, he took trips 
to Pakistan, India, and Japan318.  These trips were intended to show the U.S. that Saudi Arabia 
has other options in terms of alliances319. 
Energy is seen as a means to an end, and actors are constantly balancing their economic 
and political interests, hence economic considerations can drive politics320.  Saudi Arabia’s geo-
economic power rests on its strategic position in and its ability to exert influence in the oil 
market. Saudi Arabia’s large oil reserve base and spare capacity serves as a deterrent against 
investment by oil suppliers because Saudi Arabia can open its taps to quickly undermine the 
profitability of any new or planned project. This is a double-edged sword for the U.S. now that it 
is a major producer because Saudi Arabia’s strategic decisions may counter adversaries’ (e.g. 
Iran) re-emergence as a key player in the global energy market but at the same time hurt the 
U.S.’s unconventional oil production industry. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
It is in U.S. interest to maintain its influence in the region and develop policies that 
result in a peaceful resolution.  Understanding the appropriate regional security policies requires 
the U.S. to take into account the factors that inform the GCC’s risk perception vis-à-vis Iran. U.S. 
oil production entering the marketplace creates opportunities and gains in national security.  
The U.S. can gain greater flexibility in dealing with foreign policy challenges in major oil-
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producing countries and regions.  This is illustrated by the nuclear deal with Iran and the lifting 
of sanctions despite severe protests by Saudi Arabia. The U.S. pursuit of an alliance with Iran, 
despite causing major disagreement with current allies, is a positive long-term strategic move. 
Theoretical realists do not recommend the formation of permanent alliances because they are 
unstable. Saudi Arabia should also take this into consideration with the permanent alliance it 
has with the U.S. It is best for all Middle Eastern regional States to remain pragmatic and 
improve their relationships with rival neighbors.  
The U.S.’s pivot to Iran to even the balance of power could help prepare a foundation 
for all parties to reach a peaceful and diplomatic resolution for a variety of regional security 
issues, hence increasing U.S. influence in the region. By being friendly to both sides, the U.S. can 
mediate between deep-rooted rivalries and ideological differences that have grown to be a 
head-on competition for regional leadership. To avoid a power vacuum that guarantees an 
opening for U.S. competitors from increasing their influence in the region, the U.S. should 
continue supporting the security needs of allies in the region through smart power. This can be 
done by taking advantage of the diplomatic flexibility provided by energy independence to 
enhance national security.  This includes supporting peaceful reform in autocratic oil producing 
countries to reform governments towards democratic societies.  This will produce more stable 
powers and eventually keep the regions balance of power in equilibrium. 
Putting pressure on oil-producing Middle East countries to adopt democratic and 
uncorrupt forms of government will build resilience to internal threats and peacefully resolve 
intra-regional conflicts. It is vital for the U.S. to work with Arab countries to secure the 
sustainable long-term development of their societies.  The GCC needs to find a balance between 
reliance of the U.S. security umbrella versus rebalancing their autocratic model of governance, 
which is facing systematic structural problems. The time is overdue for the U.S. to move away 
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from decades of heavy military and intelligence operations to a diplomacy-led framework, with 
more flexible military deployments, supporting strong bilateral and regional initiatives, and 
support for civic societies and institutional building. 
 The rapid growth in domestic oil supplies and declining import dependence created the 
perception occasionally supported by U.S. policies, actions, or inactions that the U.S. is ready to 
disengage from the Middle East. This fear incentivized U.S. allies to begin seeking new security 
partners, a trend that would change the balance of power and weaken U.S. interests in the 
region. The Arab Spring proved that an unexpected and sudden regime change could occur in 
any Middle Eastern country leading to a number of internal and external known and unknown 
factors.  The potential risk to the U.S. – as illustrated by overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 –  
is the old regime supportive of U.S. interests in the region can easily be replaced by a regime 
that is not.   It is in the best interest of the U.S. to foster stability of the current States and 
preempt threats to the current balance of power that would test the fragility of these States.  
This can be done by encouraging gradual political change to a more participatory form of 
democratic government and the implementation of real accountability measures.  Also 
maintaining U.S. presence across the region is crucial to GCC stability and U.S. interests. 
U.S. presence guarantees the security of GCC States against external threats such as 
Iran, and even provides each small GCC State with a balance of power against Saudi Arabia’s 
dominance in the Arabian Peninsula.  Physical U.S. presence in the GCC provides the U.S. with a 
range of strategic options to deal with external military threats and political leverage in relation 
to maintaining a balance of power. If the U.S. disengages, Saudi Arabia will likely seek alliances 
with actors that will have negative consequences on the region’s balance of power. The problem 
with the potential Saudi Arabian pivot from the U.S. is that either China, Russia, or Pakistan is a 
pivot to unreliable partner.  These countries cannot provide the same power projection 
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capabilities or military technology weapons the U.S. provides.  In addition, the Gulf’s primarily 
U.S.-supplied conventional military weapons will be useless without U.S. logistics and 
maintenance. 
U.S. energy independence reduces its exposure to physical supply disruptions but the 
vulnerability to price shocks from the shortfalls sill remain.  The risk of conflict in the Middle East 
increases substantially if the U.S. does not maintain the status quo of the balance of power by 
remaining the regional hegemon.  If the U.S. scales back, the balance of power theory predicts 
there will be a resulting power vacuum, which will be filled by regional competitors pivoting to 
establish alliances with other internal and external actors such as China and Russia.  These 
actors have national security interests in conflict with the U.S. and therefore their alliance with 




The three chapters in this thesis center on the theme of energy security and foreign 
policy between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The stability and reliability of Saudi Arabia as a 
supplier of oil to the world plays a vital role in global economic growth and the daily lives of 
billions of people relying on energy around the world.  Saudi Arabia is an important U.S. ally and 
a strategic energy security player because it steps up at times of global crisis to offset losses and 
stabilize markets (e.g. Iraq wars, post-hurricane Katrina, and the Libyan revolution). 
  Chapter 1 introduced Saudi Arabia’s role in the global oil market as a swing producer. 
The main reason that would cause the Saudi government to shift policy and sacrifice short-term 
gain is the long-term protection of its market share. Chapter 2 concludes that the 
unconventional oil revolution can cause destabilization in Saudi Arabia.  The significant dip in oil 
prices since 2015 has caused massive deficits and problems for the Saudi government to 
implement its rentierism social contract. The shale revolution will continue to keep oil prices 
low. Chapter 3 analyzed how shale oil enhances U.S. energy independence leads to a more 
flexible foreign policy, leading to deterioration of relations with Saudi Arabia and weakening U.S. 
hegemony in the region. 
Since the primary shared interest in the U.S.-Saudi Arabian relationship is oil, this thesis 
portfolio examined why Saudi Arabia’s role in the global oil market is important and what 
implications that role has on the U.S.  The first paper answered why Saudi Arabia acts as a swing 
producer and provided reasons the U.S. can expect a shift in oil policy: to protect market share.  
Chapter 2 examined how Saudi Arabia relies on oil for internal and external stability, and how 
unconventional oil led by the U.S. could damage this power and eventually cause destabilization 
in Saudi Arabia.  Chapter 3 analyzed if U.S. energy independence could cause a deterioration of 
relations with Saudi Arabia and possibly weaken U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. 
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While the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has been volatile since 9/11, 
their shared interests helped them overcome many obstacles and both sides made sacrifices to 
ensure that diplomatic relations at the highest levels remain unstrained. Several major 
geopolitical developments that are relevant to the U.S.-Saudi alliance occurred since 9/11 and 
the ensuing war in Iraq and Afghanistan, including the U.S. advancement in shale oil extraction, 
the uprisings of the Arab Spring, and Iran nuclear framework agreement. These changes 
impacted Saudi Arabia’s reliance on the U.S. protective umbrella, at the same time the U.S. 
relied on Saudi Arabia to keep oil supply secure and at a stable price.  
Current U.S.-Saudi relations seem to have stabilized, but potential revolutionary 
changes in the Kingdom would be a disaster for American interests.  Instability in Saudi Arabia 
would cause havoc in global oil markets and hurt the U.S. economic recovery.  Saudi Arabia’s 
instability will eventually weaken the U.S. influence in the region.  Not only can internal dissent 
or external enemies spark such a revolution, disruptions in the energy market due to shale oil 
can unbalance the market that Saudi Arabia primarily depends on for national power. In 
addition, if the U.S. pivots to Iran or other regions of the world in neglect of Saudi Arabia and 
other Arabian Gulf states, the balance of power could tilt towards American rivals and increase 
the changes of destabilization in the region.  
American isolationism is not an option unless the U.S. wants the region to collapse. 
Saudi Arabia’s role as a swing producer will continue to be important for the foreseeable future 
meaning the countries stability is a priority regardless of how it is ruled.  The U.S. must sincerely 
try to implement gradual change in the region towards democracy and peace for all Middle 
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